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SURINAM'S PRIME MINISTER ARRON VISITS GUYANA, SIGNS PACT

Message of Friendship, Cooperation

Georgetown GUYANA CHRONICLE in English 19 Jun 79 pp 1, 5

[Text] GUYANA and Suriname yesterday publicly renewed pledges of friendship, unity and co-operation between their Governments and peoples at the start of the official visit by Prime Minister Hendrik Arron.

The visiting Prime Minister who touched down at Timehri International Airport and received a full ceremonial welcome, said he had brought a message of "unity and co-operation."

"It is now our common duty to bring together all those who are willing to use their resources of all kinds to build our two nations," he declared in a speech replying to a civic welcome in the Botanic Gardens.

Mayor Cecil Persaud who had the honour of according a welcome to the first Suriname head of Government to visit Guyana since that country became independent, said he hoped the visit would serve to "strengthen the ties of friendship between the peoples of Guyana and Suriname."

Addressing the visitor and his delegation in the presence of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham and Ministers of the Guyana

Government, Mayor Persaud said he was sure that the visit would improve still further, the atmosphere of trust and understanding between the two countries in which co-operation to mutual advantage could flourish.

Prime Minister Arron, speaking fluent English from a dais at the bandstand in the Gardens declared "a speech is only an incomplete and poor instrument to explain how great this moment is for me, a moment in which I feel like addressing my own people and my own nation." "In such a moment, I feel the grievance and sorrow of partition but also the joy and happiness of reunion," he added.

Using the word 'colonies' several times during his lengthy speech, the Suriname Prime Minister spoke of the common history of the two countries and the resultant heritage.

He noted that both nations belonged to the Third World and were struggling with the same problems of development.

"Colonial history," he pointed out, "brought most of us here together, but at the same time, administration, conventions and in particular interests of colonial powers divided us again."

"But nevertheless, nature, ambition and struggle for life tell us every time that we are the same and that our destiny is the same," he said as the crowd cheered.

He went on: "Therefore, I will bring you the message that after years of partition we have now finally entered upon the era of reunion."

Prime Minister Arron went into a detailed examination of

the things in common between Guyana and Suriname and said there should be a common strategy for development.

Eventually he noted that Guyana and Suriname meet at various international forums but have not yet met regularly in Paramaribo and Georgetown.

"It is for this reason I am standing here, on behalf of the Suriname people to transmit to you the message of unity and co-operation," he stressed.

Earlier, Mayor Persaud in welcoming Prime Minister Arron, his charming wife and other members of his delegation remarked on the historical significance of the visit when wishing the visitors "a warm and neighbourly welcome."

Cde Persaud observed that Guyana and Suriname were

both young, developing countries committed to the rapid development of their abundant, natural resources for the benefit of their peoples.

"In the past we have been divided as countries, by issues inherited from our colonial past; but as people, we have never been divided," he added.

Mayor Persaud stated that today, "guided by the wisdom and statesmanship of our leaders, we recognise more than ever, that the similarities of our common geography, socio-historical experience and economies, bring us together and far outweigh in the minds of our peoples, the importance attached to the issues which once divided us."

In the area of international relations, Mayor Persaud recalled that Guyana and Suriname had unhesitatingly endorsed the principles made explicit in the Charter of the United Nations.

"Particularly in our relations with each other, we are guided by the international principles of the

peaceful evolution of the relations between nations, sovereign equality, mutual respect and co-operation between and among states.

"Both our countries are working continually at the bilateral and multilateral levels for the early establishment of the new International Economic Order, under which the majority of the world's popularity who live in the poor, non-

industrialised countries, will receive a more equitable share of the world's riches.

"In our dealings with each other, we are moving along the path of collaboration. Already we have begun to share the skills and expertise which are relevant to our developmental thrusts," Mayor Persaud told the Civic Welcome guests.

He declared that it was a tribute to the calibre of political leadership in both countries that Guyana and Suriname enjoy the present level of good neighbourliness based on mutual respect and understanding.

Mayor Persaud also expressed the hope that one outcome of the visit would be to take relations between the two countries a step further along the road of friendship and co-operation.

Newsmen Exchange Proposal

Georgetown GUYANA CHRONICLE in English 21 Jun 79 p 9

[Text]

SURINAME has proposed an exchange of journalists with Guyana so that a deeper knowledge and understanding of the two countries could be promoted.

Speaking at a get-together hosted by the Guyana Press Association for members of the Suriname Press and Radio covering the visit of Prime Minister Henck Arron,

Mr. George P. Hering, Head of the Government Information Service made the proposal.

He said he first mooted the idea when he met his

Guyanese counterpart Victor Forsythe in Costa Rica about three years ago and he renewed the suggestion during discussions with Minister of State for Information, Cde. Frank Campbell.

Mr. Hering said that there was not enough time during official visits like the current one for journalists to familiarise themselves and know more about the country.

He would like to see the exchange starting after Guyana's Prime Minister has visited Suriname.

President of the Guyana Press Association Cecil Griffith agreed with the idea and made efforts to make contact with other Press Associations in the region with a view to having a Regional Press Association.

Cde. Griffith expressed the view that more news about Suriname could be channelled to Guyana in bulletins and other things put out through the Government.

Mr. Hering promised to ensure that Government newsletters are sent to Guyana more frequently.

During the informal function at which Guyana's Ambassador to Suriname, Cde. Philip Chan was present, journalists took the opportunity to exchange addresses with the members of the Suriname Press, Radio and Television.

Members of the Suriname media made a special effort to attend the midnight meeting at the Pegasus after returning from the cultural evening at Belfort Residence.

'Face the Nation' Discussions

Georgetown GUYANA CHRONICLE in English 22 Jun 79 p 1

[Excerpts] Thousands of schoolchildren gave Suriname Prime Minister Henck Arron and his delegation a rousing send-off yesterday at the end of a four-day official visit.

With the Military Band in attendance, the Prime Minister of Suriname was accorded a full ceremonial goodbye before taking leave of Cde. Burnham and his Ministers.

Before leaving the city, he had participated in a GBS "Face the Nation" recording, held discussions with the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Cuban Ambassador Ivan Caesar Martinez and answered questions at a Press conference.

Mr. Arron again stressed the importance of the Non-Aligned Movement as the forum for discussion on the social and economic problems of developing countries.

There was no instability in Guyana and Suriname, he assured newsmen. Mr. Arron said his country had discussed the question of membership in Caricom but had not come to any conclusion and the matter was still being studied.

He revealed that he would be in Havana in September when Suriname is being admitted to the Non-Aligned Movement.

Remarks From Press Conference

Georgetown GUYANA CHRONICLE in English 22 Jun 79 pp 1, 5

[Text]

THE cultural and scientific agreement signed by Guyana and Suriname is the basis on which the two peoples will get to know and understand each other better and exchange technology for development.

But an agreement of friendship and understanding and another for trade and economic co-operation to be signed when Prime Minister Forbes Burnham visits Suriname later this year will further strengthen the ties between the two countries.

These facts, arising out of the just concluded visit by Suriname's Prime Minister Henck Arron, were underscored by the two leaders yesterday at separate Press conferences, one at the Film Centre and the other at Timehri.

Prime Minister Arron who expressed the hope that the relationship between the two

● BY GEORGE ● BAIRD

countries would "live long" said the leaders had a duty not to allow anything to interrupt the present good relations.

Prime Minister Burnham commented that "there has been a steady and massive improvement in relations between the governments and peoples of the two countries starting even before the Barbados meeting when Foreign Minister Rashleigh Jackson met Mr Arron in Brazil.

Cde. Burnham said: "It is

my own view that these regular contacts over the last

few months have removed practically all of the difficulties there were between the two countries and that is as it should be."

Prime Minister Burnham, like his counterpart from Suriname did not foresee

Mr. Arron said "it was mentioned but not discussed."

Prime Minister Burnham said he and Mr. Arron had agreed that they could not solve the border question within a few hours or over a few days especially since it was one that had been in existence before the birth of either of them.

"First of all there is the Protocol of Chequemarie which has set up certain machinery or mechanics for further discussion. Those have been amplified and it is proposed that in addition to the Unidad commission provided for in the Protocol, there will be continuous, serious but informal meetings at various levels including the ministerial level," the Prime Minister of Guyana said.

Mr. Arron said too that co-operation in an ecological survey of both countries would be examined shortly.

Another important step to improve relations will be the setting up of a Suriname Embassy in Guyana "within a few weeks."

Prime Minister Arron who made this disclosure said the first ambassador had already been identified and was now in Georgetown.

Commenting on the position of Guyanese workers in Suriname, Mr. Arron said that as far as he knew they were doing well and there were no problems with the local labour force.

any obstacles to future good relations.

"There will of course, as happens in the best regulated families, be differences of opinion on one question or another.

"The important thing is to have the logistics set up for discussion where there is give and take, no hard line and no arrogance and obusenesse."

Giving further details on what had emerged from their discussions, Prime Minister Arron disclosed that within a few weeks Guyana and Suriname would be submitting joint proposals to the European Development Fund for the establishment of the ferry service between the two countries.

Mr. Arron also saw an increase in trade even before the treaty is signed in Suriname. According to him the draft is already prepared and it was only a matter of discussing a few points.

Referring to it at his Press conference, Prime Minister Burnham said the increase in trade was not necessarily dependent on, nor will it have to wait on the signature of the agreement.

Cde. Burnham said the timing of his visit depended on meshing the two busy schedules of himself and Prime Minister Arron. The visit might take place around September or October, but certainly before the end of the year.

Asked about the border dispute which had hindered good relations in the past,

U.S. HAMPERS ANDEAN INTEGRATION EFFORT: HAVANA

Havana PRISMA LATINOAMERICANO in Spanish May 79 pp 34-39

[Article by Jose Bodes Gomez]

[Text] There is somewhat of a tendency to evaluate economic integration processes by looking at their bottom line, while overlooking the social and political developments that have taken place during their history. We can also err in our approach if we do not take into account the starting point of these processes and, moreover, the economic and social structure of the countries that intend to integrate.

With regard to Latin America, the idea of integration emerged from the forums of specialists and into political decision-making offices in the 1950's. The role played by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), directed at the time by the Argentine Raul Prebisch, had a great deal to do with them being proposed and given their initial push. Thus, integration was one of the series of measures called "strength ideas" that the UN regional economic organization advocated from an intellectual standpoint.

Nevertheless, the experience of subsequent years has shown that any integration effort in Latin America contains a string of economic and social aspects that are much more complex than any scholar could have foreseen. The first element to be taken into consideration is the dependent and underdeveloped nature of the national economies, which means that the models like the one used by Western European countries to organize their common market are not suited to this region.

The first major regional integration effort, LAFTA, was designed in the early 1960's under the influence of the European free trade arrangement, and it is precisely because its inspiration was such a different structure that its progress has always been slow and riddled with stumbling blocks and that for a long time now it has been bogged down in a crisis that it has been unable to overcome in spite of the numerous efforts to do so.

The experts who created LAFTA were to a greater or lesser extent committed to the dominant political trends in Latin America and thus did not fully appreciate the extreme degree to which the region was "Balkanized," in other words, divided by the disparate interests of imperialism in each one of our countries.

For its part, the U.S. Government has always looked with mistrust and in certain cases with open hostility on any integration effort that could cut down on the maneuvering room of its capital. Integration programs in Latin America are, first of all, designed to join together the efforts that the countries of the region might be undertaking separately.

It has always been the aim of American foreign policy to maintain bilateral relations in which the strength of the more powerful country winds up by imposing its interests on the weaker country. To this we must add that in our day and age economic imperialism is exercised mainly through the transnational corporations, whose financial and technological resources are far greater than those of many underdeveloped countries.

Secondly, the idea of integration in Latin America presupposes that its objectives, whether merely commercial or comprising an economic development policy, are shared by the entire region but are different from those of the colossus of the north, since owing to its high degree of development it has long ago overcome these problems of markets and industrialization.

Nonetheless, the United States has always claimed that its leaders and businessmen identify with the difficulties that the peoples of Latin America are undergoing. We can see an example of this false image of Pan-Americanism in the Organization of American States (OAS) and its many agencies set up for neocolonial purposes, such as the IA-ECOSOC, the Special Committee for Consultation and Negotiation, etc.

The Alliance That Failed

During the previous decade, the Alliance for Progress was a very typical effort aimed at pursuing development policy within the U.S. sphere of influence. The program was launched by the Kennedy administration at a time when the Cuban Revolution was laying the groundwork of an example that has shown that development can be undertaken only when profound economic and social transformations are carried out.

The first socialist state in the Americas is now in its 20th year, and over these 20 years since the triumph of the revolution, as one of its leaders recently said, "we have grown, but we have done so as a function of development, although we have not yet been able to overcome underdevelopment"; meanwhile, it has been a decade now since the Alliance for Progress was scrapped by its own organizers, and the countries of Latin

America, even the ones that have recorded some growth, are just as far, and in many cases farther, from the sought-after takeoff towards their development.

The obstacles encountered by LAFTA in its attempt to create a Latin American common market also served as an instructive experience for a number of countries in the region, and after overcoming the natural dejection prompted by this failure, their imagination was stimulated to give shape to a new type of integration model, more modest in its geographic scope but more specific in terms of its goals. Thus emerged the Andean Pact, and the first step towards its organization was taken by the governments of Colombia, Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru at the conference held in Bogota on 16 August 1966.

The "Declaration of Bogota," signed on that date, gave rise to a Joint Commission that was charged with hammering out a subregional integration agreement. Over a 2-year period delegates from the five countries (Bolivia joined in as well) drew up the complex and difficult mechanism that was finally approved at its sixth working meeting, which closed on 5 May 1969, and whose official name was the Andean Subregional Integration Agreement. Three weeks later, in the Colombian city of Cartagena, the instrument was signed by the plenipotentiaries of Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru.

The road traveled even before the birth of the pact had been thorny and not free from dissension. The Venezuelan delegation decided to withdraw from the Joint Commission because of the poor reception accorded its proposal that the higher costs of its industrial production prevented it from opening up its domestic market to the rest of the Andean nations under competitive conditions. Some years later, in February 1973, these obstacles were surmounted by the political will asserted by both sides, and Venezuela became part of the subregional integration system.

The Andean Pact was organized within the institutional framework of LAFTA, which thus acknowledged its compatibility in July 1969, although in the practical application of its principles we would see later on that the new association had its sights aimed at loftier objectives.

The Cartagena Agreement established as its major objectives "to promote the balanced and harmonious development of its member countries, to accelerate their growth through economic integration, to facilitate their participation in the integration process set forth in the Treaty of Montevideo and to establish favorable conditions for converting LAFTA into a common market." With regard to this last mentioned goal, the Andean countries have logically not been able to achieve what has also been impossible for the rest of the members of LAFTA, but what is indicative about the above declaration is that it places the goal of development before the notion of integration itself.

Indispensable Transformations

As the Cuban delegation to the World Conference of Economists, held in Budapest in August 1974, stated, integration "cannot by itself achieve and much less assure the development of countries and areas in which profound structural transformations are required as a precondition," adding: "These transformations of the dependent and neocolonial capitalist socioeconomic structures, such as a true agrarian reform, the nationalization of key economic sectors, sovereign control over natural resources, the redistribution of income to the benefit of the masses, access to education and culture and others, cannot be replaced or averted by integration."

The "aseptic" theory of integration, lacking the indispensable prerequisites for its implementation, has caused serious damage to underdeveloped countries and triggered crises for those that still uphold economic ideas at variance with the social and political realities of those states. We witnessed a dramatic demonstration that this dissociation is untenable when the institutional upheaval that led to the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile took place, after which the Military Junta that seized power threw overboard the commitments contracted with the other member states of the Andean Pact.

The process of changes begun by Popular Unity was cut short, and what is more, the new rulers began undoing the gains already achieved. Subregionally, the strongest impact of the Chilean coup was on the common arrangement for handling foreign capital. The system had been approved in December 1970 with the signing of Decision 24, perhaps the most controversial of all of the Andean Pact's agreements inasmuch as, despite its limitations, it established the precedent of consolidating the stands of five Latin American countries vis-a-vis foreign investment.

A conscientious analysis of this decision must lead to the conclusion that its adoption alone does not entail the elimination of imperialist control over those countries' economies, inasmuch as it involves mechanisms that do not substantially affect the relationship of foreign dependence, because we must keep in mind that foreign capital dominates vast sectors of technology, skilled manpower and production and services structures, and therefore under such conditions displacing it would be very difficult, in addition to curtailing their freedom of action.

The Big Stick

Nevertheless, the reaction on Wall Street was explosive. The "Council of the Americas," acting as a spokesman of the U.S. transnational corporations, stated that the legislation on foreign capital would cause a drop in investment, even domestic investment, thus making clear something that is generally kept concealed: the dependence of native

capital on the big monopolies. "This weakening of the social and political stability of the nations in the Andean area and these consequences," the document added, "could well affect other nations in the Americas." Here once again, imperialism was essaying the well-known strategy of "divide and conquer" by trying to blame the Andean nations for any reprisals that might be taken against Latin America as a whole.

Years later, in July 1974, the Pinochet government took up the attacks on Decision 24 and enacted the "Investor Statute," which annulled several clauses regulating foreign capital, such as the limit of 14 percent a year on profit remittances as a proportion of total investment, the deadlines of 15 to 20 years for converting foreign into domestic enterprises and the prevailing jurisdiction of the host country in the event of a dispute.

The Andean Pact crisis triggered by the stand of the Chilean military, who also disagreed with the Cartagena Agreement's tariff policy, aimed at gradually reducing customs barriers between the countries of the subregion, caused the group's negotiations to be taken up in a search for solutions to the dispute, and consequently the chances for a continued implementation of the integration program were reduced to a minimum.

As a conciliatory gesture, the other members of the Andean Pact agreed to amend the foreign investment code by increasing profit remittances to 20 percent, by boosting from 5 to 7 percent of established capital the profits that could be reinvested without prior official authorization, by granting subregional capital the same treatment as domestic capital, which includes the right to repatriate profits, among other reforms of Decision 24.

With respect to tariff policy, the effective date of the common foreign tariff was postponed until the 1980's, but in the end an agreement could not be reached with Chile, which insisted that the average customs duties be set at around 30 percent to favor imports of capital goods from the developed countries, whereas the other member states supported an increase in this barrier to 70 percent in order to guarantee their industrialization projects.

Pinochet's representatives withdrew from the Andean Pact on 4 August 1976, which necessitated a reassessment of integration programs in order to tailor them to the current membership. This task required a long time, as demonstrated by the fact that it was only by mid-1978, 2 years after Chile's withdrawal, that they were able to conclude reassigning projects within the subregional program for the development of the metal machinery industry.

The transnational corporations have adjusted their policy towards the Andean Pact and from initial open confrontation have adopted a more subtle, though no less dangerous, tactic: trying to infiltrate their capital. When this becomes difficult, they make use of , assures or surreptitious measures to thwart plans that they regard as disadvantageous.

"We have been struggling for integration for 10 years and every time that we achieve something important, those sectors jeopardize it because they are still extremely powerful," stated the then foreign minister of Venezuela, Simon Alberto Consalvi, when international bidding on the Andean automotive program was being discussed in July 1978. The U.S. firms Ford and General Motors were vying at the time for the fat contract assigned jointly to Venezuela and Ecuador that called for the manufacture of 16,000 trucks and 40,000 cars for the subregional market starting in 1982. In the end, General Motors emerged the winner. Finance is another sector in which imperialist interests are at work. The Andean Development Corporation (CAF), which began its activities in 1970, has come up against the natural difficulties of a credit institution made up of countries with scant resources. Since its outset, however, it has received offers of technical assistance and financial cooperation from organizations that, like the Inter-American Development Bank, are controlled by the United States through the system of voting tied to the amount of capital input. It was not long before the CAF acknowledged "the obstacle represented by the heavy burden of obligations, resulting from international financing, in the form of amortizations and interest payments"; this was in 1972.

Like the rest of Latin America, the Andean countries have in recent years been feeling the effects of a protectionist policy that has been intensified by the U.S. Government. In June of last year they issued a statement pointing out that "the new regulations on sugar import duties imposed by the United States are causing serious harm to the Latin American countries that export this item," adding that "the U.S. protectionist policy would also affect exports of zinc and refined copper if it were to establish duties in addition to the current ones."

The statement pointed in particular to the situation in Bolivia and its basic product, noting that "the sale of strategic reserves greatly affects the developing countries that export such items and in the specific case of tin, a major exporting country in the Andean Group."

Gains and Snags

As Luis Barandiaran Pagador of Peru, a member of the Cartagena Agreement Board, recently explained, one of the Andean Pact's accomplishments has been an increase in trade within the subregion. Regional trade has risen from somewhat more than \$100 million in 1969 to more than \$900 million last year, with manufactured goods accounting for about 40 percent.

The total foreign trade of the five member countries in 1978 represented 31.68 percent of Latin America's overall trade with all areas of the world. Andean Group exports were valued at \$14.17 billion, as against imports of \$17.75 billion, yielding a trade deficit of \$604 million. Venezuela's balance had a decisive impact on this deficit because it accounts for more than half of subregional trade.

In connection with sectoral programming of industrial development, progress has not gone according to schedule, and only three (metal machinery, petrochemicals and automotive) of a total of eight programs have been approved. Together, they call for investments of \$5.5 billion and represent the nucleus of the future development of Andean manufacturing output.

Cartagena Agreement Board experts feel that fresh decisions are required for industrial and agricultural programming, for the common foreign tariff and for coordinated economic policies in order to make them viable or speed up their implementation.

Among the objectives set forth for this year, particular importance is attached to the creation of the Andean Tribunal of Justice, which will be in charge of assessing the legality of the regulations issued by the policy-making bodies of the integration process and of settling controversies over the fulfillment of these obligations.

The Andean economic union is supposed to be completed by the next decade, and among other things this will mean that merchandise will move within the Andean area without duties or restrictions and that a common tariff protection for subregional products will have been worked out for all goods.

During the ceremonies last August in Bogota on the occasion of the inauguration of Colombian President Julian Cesar Turbay Ayala, the presidents of Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia met with the new chief executive and with the prime minister of Peru to reaffirm "the current validity of the objectives the pursuit of which inspired our countries to set in motion this integration process."

"The desire to achieve the balanced and harmonious development of the member countries, the goal of having faster economic growth that will enable these countries to truly take part in the Latin American integration process and the equitable distribution of the benefits of integration are, still today, accomplishments that the countries committed to the Cartagena Agreement aspire to see proclaimed as the fruit of their community efforts," the joint declaration asserts, adding: "Therefore, convinced of the importance of the Andean Group and aware of the difficulties inherent in any integration process, we regard it as fundamental to reassert the determination that inspires the presidents

of the member countries and, above all, the firm decision of the governments to contribute to the search for solutions to the problems that affect the advancement of the process today."

On 26 May, the presidents of Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador will again meet in the city that saw the birth of the Cartagena Agreement, 10 years after that historic decision. This stage has unquestionably been a harsh test of survival, but the new period will also certainly require the greatest determination and steadfastness to travel the difficult road of integration, an integration that demands profound transformations to be truly beneficial to the people.

What Is the Andean Group Like?

	Square Kms	Population	% Urban	% Literate	Life Expectancy	Per Capita
Bolivia	1,098,581	5,285,000	39.17	40	51 years	\$360
Colombia	1,138,338	25,614,000	63.31	70	62 "	\$673
Ecuador	270,670	7,543,000	42.14	81	60 "	\$505
Peru	1,285,215	16,821,000	61.77	67.7	57 "	\$578
Venezuela	912,050	13,989,000	75.56	82.7	66 "	\$1,351

Source: United Nations, except for literacy, which is based on data from the local press.

A Decade of the Pact

Our correspondents' office in Lima, the seat of this subregional agreement, has outlined for us the 10-year history of Andean integration.

26 May 1969: Experts from Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru sign a subregional integration agreement in the Colombian port city of Cartagena.

21 November 1969: The first meeting of the commission, the top body of the Andean Group, which agrees to call the integration effort the "Cartagena Agreement" and begins to set up its technical structure.

24 November 1969: First meeting of the foreign ministers of the member nations of the Andean Group concludes in Lima.

31 January 1970: The ministers of education of Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Chile, Peru and Venezuela sign the Andres Bello agreement for educational, scientific and cultural integration.

31 December 1970: The Cartagena Agreement commission creates the planning, monetary and exchange, financing, fiscal policy and foreign trade councils and sets down guidelines for the formation of specific new councils.

31 December 1970: The commission passes Decisión No., the statute setting up a common system for dealing with foreign capital; it limits the amounts of royalties that can be taken out of the member countries and sets deadlines for their conversion into joint or national capital.

14 March 1971: The Second Meeting of Andean Group Foreign Ministers concludes in the Peruvian city of Cuzco.

26 May 1971: First meeting of the ministers of industry and economy of the subregion, in Bogota and Cartagena.

2 September 1971: The constitutional president of Chile, Salvador Allende, visits the main headquarters of the Cartagena Agreement in Lima.

3 December 1971: The Venezuelan Government officially communicates its decision to formalize negotiations for joining the Andean Group.

31 December 1971: First Meeting of the Ministers of Health of the pact member countries, and Venezuela concluding the signing of the Hipolito Unanue health care integration agreement.

16 March 1972: Negotiations for Venezuelan membership in the Cartagena Agreement begin.

27 March 1972: Third Meeting of Education Ministers in connection with Andres Bello Agreement, in Quito.

20 May 1972: The chairman of the EEC Commission, Joao Mansholt, visits the seat of the Cartagena Agreement in Lima.

19 June 1972: Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the subregion in Lima.

14 July 1972: The commission approves the regulations for international road transport among member countries.

20 August 1972: The commission approves the first joint industrial development program: metal machinery.

17 November 1972: The Andean-Argentine Commission is set up.

15 December 1972: The Andean-Chilean Cooperation Commission is set up.

13 February 1973: In Lima, President Hugo Chávez signs in Venezuela as a member of the Andean Group.

30 March 1973: First Meeting of Pact Labor Ministers in Quito.

16 April 1973: Fourth Meeting of Education Ministers, in Caracas.

17 May 1973: Hispano-Andean Cooperation Commission created.

3 July 1973: Second Meeting of Health Ministers, in Quito.

1 August 1973: Fourth Meeting of Andean Group Foreign Ministers, in Lima.

22 October 1973: The Second Meeting of Labor Ministers culminates with the signing of the Simon Rodriguez socio-labor integration agreement.

30 January 1974: First Meeting of Agriculture Ministers, in Lima.

16 July 1974: The president of Mexico, Luis Echeverria Alvarez, visits the seat of the Andean Group in Lima.

27 November 1974: Third Meeting of Health Ministers, in Caracas.

7 April 1975: Sixth Meeting of Education Ministers, in Vina del Mar, Chile.

14 April 1975: Third Conference of Labor Ministers, in Lima.

29 August 1975: The commission approves the joint program for the development of the petrochemical industry.

12 May 1976: Fourth Conference of Labor Ministers, in Cartagena.

31 July 1976: Seventh Meeting of Education Ministers, in Bogota.

30 October 1976: Chile withdraws from the Andean Group because the military regime's economic policy is incompatible with that of the group.

30 October 1976: The commission resolves to modify the system for the common handling of foreign capital and extends the deadlines for approval of the industrial programs.

10 November 1976: Second Meeting of Agriculture Ministers, in Quito.

12 November 1976: Andean Reserves Fund is created, with an initial capital of \$240 million, in order to shore up the balances of payments of member countries.

5 December 1976: Fourth Meeting of Health Ministers, in Bogota.

29 April 1977: The commission approves a special support program for Bolivia.

8 July 1977: Eighth Meeting of Education Ministers, in Lima.

7 September 1977: The presidents of the member countries meet in Washington and agree to give top priority to subregional integration.

13 September 1977: In Quito the commission approves the program for the joint development of the automotive industry.

23 September 1977: Fifth Conference of Labor Ministers, in Santa Cruz, Bolivia.

3 October 1977: First Italian-Andean Meeting, in Rome.

8 December 1977: Third Meeting of Agriculture Ministers, in Bogota.

29 March 1978: Argentine Foreign Minister Oscar Antonio Montes visits seat of Andean Group.

31 March 1978: The secretary general of UNCTAD, Camani Corea, visits the seat of the Cartagena Agreement.

6 April 1978: Fifth Meeting of Health Ministers, in Santa Cruz, Bolivia.

21 April 1978: An additional pact is signed in Arequipa, Peru to set new deadlines for industrial programming and the reformulation of the programs, in consideration of Chile's withdrawal and Venezuela's entry.

October 1978-January 1979: After lengthy negotiations, the commission approves additional regulations for the automotive industry, in order to facilitate bilateral agreements among member states.

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INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

CARIFESTA PREPARATIONS REPORTED

Hart Meets CARICOM Officials

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 4 Jun 79 p 5

[Article by Omar Vazquez]

[Text] Armando Hart, a member of the Politburo and the minister of culture, has held a friendly meeting with the Advisory Commission of CARICOM. The commission is made up of Frank Pilgrim, CARICOM cultural adviser; Lynette Delphin, the director of the Department of Culture of the Guyana Ministry of Education and Culture; Joy Scott, the director of international relations in the Ministry of Mobilization, Information and Culture of Jamaica; Orlando van Amson and James Ramdal, the secretary and assistant director of culture, respectively, in the Ministry of Education and Public Development of Suriname, and Norma E. Talma, the director of culture in the Ministry of Education and Culture of Barbados.

Hart emphasized the efforts of Guyana and Jamaica in the successful celebration of the first and second Carifesta festivals and also underscored the important work of the Advisory Commission and its effective contribution to the preparation, organization and artistic participation of Caribbean English-speaking countries and Suriname in Carifesta.

During the informal and enthusiastic meeting views were exchanged regarding the organization of Carifesta, the third edition of which will be held between 16 and 22 July in Havana as its headquarters and in Santiago as subheadquarters.

Hart stressed the profoundly popular nature of the various expressions of Caribbean culture and its growing influence in the world, and he emphasized the common features uniting the peoples of the Caribbean.

For their part, the representatives of English-speaking Caribbean countries, Suriname and CARICOM reported that their countries are very enthusiastic about and interested in taking part in the Third Carifesta Festival, which augurs certain success for this major Caribbean cultural event.

Also present at the meeting were Rafael Almeida, the first deputy minister of culture; Julio Garcia Espinosa, deputy culture minister and director general of the Carifesta Organizing Commission; Rolando Rodriguez, deputy culture minister, and directors and officials in the ministries of culture and foreign relations.

CARICOM Preparations

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 4 Jun 79 p 5

[Article by Omar Vazquez]

[Text] The members of the CARICOM Advisory Commission who are visiting our country were received at the Culture Ministry in a ceremony during which Julio Garcia Espinosa gave them a report on the work being done in Cuba with an eye towards the event.

According to Garcia Espinosa's explanations, they have come for the purpose of exchanging impressions with the Cuban Committee on the organizational aspects of the Third Festival of Creative Arts of the Caribbean, which will be held from 16 to 22 July, and in order to verify the participation in it of the countries that attended the meeting of ministers that was called by UNESCO and held in Colombia.

In his speech the deputy culture minister referred to the background of Carifesta and to the festivals held in Guyana in 1972 and Jamaica in 1976. He reported that Barbados is being proposed as the site of the next festival, which will be held in 1981, and that from then on the hope is that it can be held every 2 years.

He also stressed that we live in an area that has common cultural roots, which we must be aware of because they could mean the strengthening of relations among the countries on the Caribbean and underscore the power of the arts as a unifying force in achieving the social aspirations of our respective countries.

Also officiating at the ceremony were Julio Vergara, the secretary general of the Party Committee in the ministry; Alexei Dompierre, from the UJC [Union of Young Communists], and Densil Laurent, from the Labor Union Section. Later, those attending the get-together enjoyed a performance by the great Haitian artist Marta Jean Claude.

Suriname Participation

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 4 Jun 79 p 5

[Text] Georgetown (PL)—We Surinamers will go to Cuba as friends and return as brothers, James Ramdal, the assistant director of culture in the Suriname Education Ministry, stated here.

The high-ranking Suriname official is in Cuba, along with Orlando van Amson from the same ministry, for a preparatory meeting in connection with Carifesta-79, the Caribbean's number one cultural event.

The Suriname officials reported that preparations in Paramaribo are winding down for the July event and that they hope that some 150 Surinamers will travel to Cuba to attend Carifesta-79.

Suriname will take part in all of the events of Carifesta-79 because we have to underscore our Caribbean identity, they added.

We are happy and we thank Cuba for giving our artists the opportunity to get to know the artists and people of Cuba and of the other nations in the region, Ramlal pointed out.

We know that this event will help to strengthen even further the ties between Cuba and Suriname, he stated.

Ramlal emphasized that the peoples of Cuba and Suriname would discover their common cultural heritage, which would contribute to a greater understanding between the two countries.

He explained that Cuba has sent a number of its leading artists to Suriname, such as the percussion group "Los Papines," but that this would be the first time that Suriname artists would be performing for the Cuban people.

We are interested in learning about the different cultural roots of the participating countries and we will be sending a delegation that fully represents our cultural heritage, Ramlal and van Amson pointed out.

They stated that there is a great deal of enthusiasm in their country over the selection of the artists that will perform in Cuba.

They explained that Suriname would be present at the "Gala Evening" but that it is also interested in presenting its typical "Kaseko" rythm, which reflects both Latin and Afro-Caribbean influences.

The delegation will also include a modern ballet group, a folklore group, and singers, dancers and painters from the country's broad cultural gamut.

According to the officials, the Suriname exhibition will include presentations of Indian, Javanese, Amerindian, Creole, Dutch and Asian origin, as well as the "Bush-Negro" percussion group from the interior of the country.

Eastern Caribbean Antilles Participation

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 30 May 79 p 5

[Article by Jorge Luna.]

[Text] Georgetown, 29 May (PL)—Frank Pilgrim, the cultural head of CARICOM, today underscored the active participation of many islands in the region in Carifesta-79, which will be held in Cuba in July.

The ranking regional official has just visited several CARICOM islands to meet with culture authorities and artistic groups in those countries with an eye towards their participation in the Caribbean's number one cultural event.

He noted that "most of the so-called relatively less developed countries really want to take part," because some of them were not involved in the second Carifesta, held in Jamaica in 1976.

He also pointed out that these countries are very grateful for the UNESCO director general's recent offer to furnish transportation to Cuba for their delegations.

Pilgrim stated that most of the delegations are still in the preparatory stage, but he confirmed the attendance of "a wide gamut of Caribbean cultural representations."

The culture official, who visited some 10 countries in 20 days, said that CARICOM is in permanent contact with culture authorities in those countries in order to finalize preparations.

He disclosed that the delegations from the region's smallest islands would probably gather in Saint Kitts, from where they would set sail for Cuba.

PRENSA LATINA interviewed Pilgrim today in connection with the status of preparations, and he pointed out that some figures are already available and that they are familiar with what the cultural presentations being prepared will be like.

He said that two major groups are getting ready in Saint Kitts; one is a folkloric dance troupe called "Masquerade," and the other is a typical local orchestra. Other artists will bring the total to about 47.

Some 30 artists from Montserrat are rehearsing stage works in particular for Carifesta-79, in addition to which a calypso group will attend.

Some 80 youths will be representing Grenada, including dancers, singers, writers, percussionists and the famous "pole fighters" from the Grenadine island of Carriacou.

The island of St. Lucia already has three theatrical works ready, of which it will choose one for Carifesta-79. In all, some 70 artists will be performing, including dancers, painters, sculptors and poets.

In addition, some 76 youths will represent the island of St. Vincent, including a large metal percussion group and a folkloric chorus.

Pilgrim said that this week a number of countries would officially confirm their participation, and therefore the above figures are partial or incomplete.

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AALAPSO SEES COMMON CAUSE IN NICARAGUA, EL SALVADOR ACTION

Havana JUVENTUD REBELDE in Spanish 29 May 79 p 1

[Article by Juan M. La Rotta]

[Text] Humberto Gonzalez, the representative in Cuba of the "Parabundo Marti" Popular Armed Forces of Liberation (FPL) of El Salvador, gave a press conference last night at the headquarters of AALAPSO.

The FPL representative gave a detailed account of the struggle that his people have been waging from the colonial period to the present, as they now carry on a frontal assault on the dictatorship of Carlos Humberto Romero.

He underscored the regime's latest repressive actions, during which many youths and men of the people who supported the just demands of the Revolutionary Popular Bloc were massacred.

In conclusion, he pointed out that the struggle of the Salvadoran people is indissolubly linked to the cause of the peoples of Nicaragua and Guatemala, who are up against the most bloodthirsty regimes in this part of Central America, as well as Yankee imperialism.

In addition, Iraida Montalvo, the assistant secretary general of AALAPSO, read a communique from the organization demanding a broader and more combative solidarity with the heroic people of El Salvador, who have been victims of brutal repression by the Romero regime.

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'GRANMA' COMMENTS ON BRUTAL REPRESSION IN EL SALVADOR

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 30 May 79 p 6

[Article by Arsenio Rodriguez]

[Text] Political assassination has been legalized in El Salvador for quite some time.

The latest drama-charged events augur the beginning of another blood-stained phase in the history of the smallest Central American republic. It will be all the more so now that a state of siege has been decreed, which gives the henchmen of the Carlos Humberto Romero regime a free hand to commit their crimes with yet greater impunity.

But if Romero did not initiate such brutal methods of repression, it does seem that he is trying to outdo his predecessors.

We must not forget the new style of eliminating opponents that the Salvadoran military has introduced: using explosives to blow up detainees or people suspected of being subversives.

It was not until very recently that the repeated appearance of wrecked cars and mutilated bodies along the city's outlying roads and highways began to attract people's attention.

The truth was learned only quite recently when one of the survivors recounted how he was able to save himself.

The repression begun in the 1930's during the initial period of the military tyranny of Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez created an entire apparatus in El Salvador dedicated to the physical elimination of opponents.

There have been countless murders over the last 40 years, as hundreds of Salvadorans were brutally slaughtered. The crime at the cathedral is the first link in a fresh escalation of the repression.

Specialized groups exist for this purpose, such as the Nationalist Democratic Organization (ORDEN), the White Warrior Union (UGB), the Armed Forces for Anticommunist Liberation and War of Elimination (PALANCE) and other no less bloodthirsty organizations.

All of them without exception were created by the military regimes in their futile attempt to check the people's uprising, and Romero is no outsider to this because he was defense minister before becoming president and had a direct hand in organizing them domestically.

These organizations operate with impunity and with official backing, but their activities appear unrelated to the regime. They are thus a veritable army dedicated to doing the dirty work but which cannot be recognized as legal.

We should recall the context in which the new regime headed by Romero arose as well as its attempt to put forth a democratic image, even if only for official propaganda.

He became president in July 1977, shortly after Carter took office in the United States. After the electoral fraud that made him president despite rejection by the people, he tried in his speeches to call for "harmony, unity and peace."

It took very little time for the dictator to show his true face. Just months after taking office, he decreed the Law of Defense and Guarantee of Public Order, a legal instrument to satisfy the demands of the national oligarchy to repress the people.

The dozens of people killed and the hundreds of people wounded over the last few weeks become, under that law, criminals, lawbreakers and enemies of "democracy and order."

It does not matter that photos show the faces of university students, boys and even children torn apart by shrapnel in the streets of El Salvador.

Barbarism has again prevailed, disclosing the true face of the regime.

The events in El Salvador surprised some people, but the Salvadoran people are well aware of how long they have been undergoing these tribulations. Now, however, the major bourgeois press media on the continent have been forced to draw the curtain of silence that used to conceal the reality of this country.

The fact is, independently of their traditional struggle to open up more human horizons, the Salvadoran people are part of the great Central American family.

The explosive situation in this part of the continent is not alien to them. Their struggles are allied with those of Nicaraguans, Guatemalans and other nationalities in the region. Their enemy is the same, although the initial battle must be fought against the Romeros, the Somozas and the entire clique imposed on the zone by American imperialism.

The courageous response of Salvadoran teachers and the constant demonstrations of rejection against the latest crimes committed by the regime show that the people are determined to continue their struggle, not only to secure the release of the prisoners but also to begin the conquest of their true and definitive liberation.

Not even all of the criminals in the paramilitary organizations combined, including the national guard and its Yankee advisers, will be able to slake the wrath of the people.

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TRADE UNION LEADERS TRAINING IN CUBA INTERVIEWED

Havana TRABAJADORES in Spanish 19 Apr 79 p 3

[Text] Trade union leaders from several countries on the continent recently completed courses for Latin American and Caribbean union men at the Lazaro Pena School. The following are their impressions of these courses.

Cesar Rengifo Ruiz, from the Central Organization of Workers of the Peruvian Revolution-Department of Lima (CTEP-Lima):

"As labor leaders, the time that we have spent in this school has enabled us to abandon many plans, to gain a clear view of many theoretical and practical aspects of union life and, in addition, to admire close up the accomplishments of Cuban workers and their revolution. We have been able to see how May Day festivities are organized in Cuba with the awareness and full participation of the workers and all the people and how the historic alternative of the working class is being revealed on this island.

"From the standpoint of union unity, it has been very beneficial to exchange experiences with other Latin American labor leaders. We will bring all of these experiences back to our organizations and to Peruvian workers."

Mario Redondo, from the Trade Union Confederation of Workers of Colombia (CSTC):

"This experience has been vital because it has given us the opportunity to approach the role of the union and the reality within which it ought to be operating from a class-oriented viewpoint. Theoretical information has been complemented by basic things like practical know-how, contact with Cuban workers, visits to factories. There, we learned the role that workers play in this society and why they are the protagonists of the revolution.

"As far as May Day is concerned, in my country the bourgeoisie has tried to take away its combative and proletarian nature and give it festive,

passive, even religious overtones. Nevertheless, to us each May Day is a day of struggle against the oligarchy and their imperialist protector, against the high cost of living, repression, unemployment, poverty and employer subterfuges."

Balram Balkarran, from the Guyana Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU):

"With its courses this institution is contributing a great deal to the trade union unity of Latin American and Caribbean workers. The course for Caribbean labor leaders is extremely important for us in particular because our region has very peculiar characteristics in terms of culture, language and society that have been utilized on many occasions to keep us disunited from our brothers on the continent. That is why we are happy, because we see that ties with Latin American worker organizations are increasing.

"I take with me from Cuba pleasant memories, thrills, confirmed ideas and broader approaches. The working spirit of the workers and all the Cuban people in the construction of a socialist society has impressed me greatly."

Fernando Camurano, from the National Convention of Uruguayan Workers:

"These courses are of the utmost importance for delving more deeply into our task as labor leaders, a contribution to the strengthening of the Latin American union movement. We can underscore the quality of the subjects taught, of the professors and workers at the school and the spirit of camaraderie that prevails in everyone.

"In connection with May Day, you can imagine under what conditions workers in my country will be celebrating it, in the midst of repression and torture in a nation that has more than 6,000 political prisoners, 4,00 of whom are union leaders. But we are aware and certain that the Uruguayan working class is going to celebrate this May Day as a day of struggle against these bitter realities."

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POLITICAL PARTIES SEEK UNITY, ISSUE PROPOSALS

New Peronist Movement

Buenos Aires LA NACION in Spanish 5 Jun 79 p 14

[Text] One of the items in the document establishing the Movement of Peronist Affirmation and Renovation [MARPE], formed by Peronist leaders from the federal capital's 28 districts, states: "On the basis of one of our party principles, we want the organization (which it will acquire in time) to be a reflection of democratic internal activity, with a combination of all the spectra which comprise it, so that its government and leadership will result therefrom, banishing forever both partisan inflexibility and unipersonal leadership which, now that Peron is dead, no longer have any reason to exist."

Party Leadership

The establishment of MARPE took place during a meeting in which former secretaries general and national congressmen of the Peronist movement participated. The document approved on that occasion emphasizes the aspiration of its signers that "the best men, those who are most representative, capable and loyal, with full political weight, will assume the party leadership, eliminating forever maneuvering, spurious orders or preliminary machinations which, rather than lending the party a lofty status, have harmed it, despite the unanimous desire of the members who want for their cadres men and women who are suitable, with their own capacity for development and with their gaze fixed on the righteousness of our slogan: 'The fatherland first, then the movement and finally the individuals.'"

MARPE calls for a "party renovation," which will afford a return to doctrinal orthodoxy, and which will be achieved "in the convergence of the middle generation and the old and young leaders." The document states: "We are on the side of everyone, and never against anyone; because we believe in the unity of all sectors of Peronism." And it emphasizes that there will be no acceptance of "fronts or agreements with sectors or parties which are the antithesis of this great national, deeply humanistic and Christian movement."

Alluding to a possible reform of the national constitution, it maintains: "This should only be done insofar as it will strengthen individual rights

and guarantees, and insofar as it will lend a certain fluid quality to democratic life in its political areas, and will insure the harmonious activity of the republican institutions."

Legal Entities

After claiming that national unity will be achieved only through "the people's actual participation in the decisions related to public life," MARPE states that it recognizes "as the only legal entities of the Justicialist Party the Council and National Congress, their agent and the intervention in the capital district."

This document was signed by Ergasto Martijena, Felipe Torres, Mario Corradini, Jose Martinez, Carlos Stefanolo, Gabriel Damil, Santiago Gitto, Diego Oliver, Oscar Vitola, Pedro Deglaude, Norberto Mittullo, Luis Armella Quiroga, Tino Lence, Eustacio Britez, Luis Santos Casale, Salomon Arguid, Abel Casto Medina, Jacob Toundaian, Julio Cabana, Alejandro Mackluff, Adan Mirrantes, Antonio Speroni, Americo Arroyo, Eleuterio Martinez, Dimanantino Rodriguez, Julio Libonatti, Carlos Kloetzlen, Benigno Monsalvo, Aristides Avena, Antonio Giglio and Ruben Antonio Garcia.

Political Document Issued

Buenos Aires LA NACION in Spanish 13 Jun 79 p 5

[Text] The first deputy chairman of the Justicialist Party's National Council holding the chairmanship, court clerk Deolindo Felipe Bittel, and the chairman of the party's National Congress, Prof Eloy Prospero Camus, signed a document entitled "The Case of Yacyreta and the Nation's Destiny." With regard to the situation that has been created in connection with the Argentine-Paraguayan hydroelectric project, they state: "We are confronted with gross mistakes in leadership and the consequences of a policy that is completely at odds with the nation's interest." They add: "We are confronted with a fact which proves the improper handling of the hydroelectric problem and, simultaneously, with the weakness that has beset the state of the country."

"Detimental treatment"

After a brief review of the features of the Yacyret^a matter, wherein it is stressed that Argentina "has received treatment detrimental to its dignity," the Peronist leaders declare: "A well directed Argentina, with a full expansion of its economy and a suitable cohesion among its social and political forces, would not have been met with this regrettable situation."

Another paragraph in the document is devoted to questioning the overall energy policy. They say: "We have a policy for the sector which, instead of considering the country as great, regards it as small." Then they claim that the problem is "more deepseated and more global," and that it explains the "weakness in which we find ourselves in all international negotiations,

a weakness that has converted more than one invocation of sovereignty into rhetoric." In describing the aforementioned problem, Bittel and Camus point out that Argentina "has undermined its negotiating capacity from within, in its own innermost recesses. Foreign policy is always a projection of national policy, and herein lies the cause of our weakness and retrogression."

"Tensions and Divisions"

A criticism of the economic policy precedes the assertion to the effect that the Yacyreta problem exists "because the national policy has engendered social tensions and divisions, and a deepseated demoralization, which has affected all the popular classes. Therefore, it is inconceivable to imagine an international presence which is, as it should be, vital, significant and relevant."

They also state that "we are doing nothing" to counteract the "detestable campaign of discreditation abroad," and the "attitudes in violation of specific aspects of international law;" and, as a result, the country has not been restored to the "status marked by importance and consideration that it managed to maintain throughout nearly all of its history."

"Small Group"

They declare: "We shall not succumb to the error of simplification, by holding the armed forces responsible for an economic and social policy that was not devised by them, but rather by a small group with a tendency that is probably reactionary." They point out that the armed forces are "victims of the present orientation," inasmuch as they "are committed to a policy line that is not one geared to the steadfast national concept which inspires them;" and they cite the existence of "periodic declarations by high-ranking leaders" in support of the group which "has imposed" its orientation on the country.

In conclusion, they state: "We are convinced that an organic unity between the people and the armed forces, which has produced glorious results in the past is the only path which will lead to a definitive solution to the crisis and the establishment of a real, operative democracy."

Bittel and Camus

Yesterday, it was indicated in Peronist circles that Bittel and Camus had attempted, through the document which both signed, to demonstrate to the internal party front that there is a political understanding between them, a fact concerning which doubts arose last week, when there was no quorum at the meeting of the National Justicialist Council which they were supposed to attend.

The degree of understanding between the two is considered important in the same circles, because the document makes proposals on such matters as the

onviction that an "organic unity" between the people and the armed forces, "which has produced glorious results in the past" could solve the crisis and establish democracy.

Peronist Consolidation

Buenos Aires LA NACION in Spanish 15 Jun 79 p 5

[Text] Peronist circles in the capital claim that contacts have been made between leaders of that movement and sectors of the national government. It is also said that those contacts would warrant the assumption that a Peronist political proposal would be received with at least curiosity on certain echelons of the government structure.

Considered linked with these assumptions is the fact that a group of Justicialist politicians, including Manuel de Anchorena, Deolindo Felipe Bittel, Miguel Unamuno, Herminio Iglesias, Ricardo Guardo and Manuel Arauz Castex, among others, has just announced that it is studying a Peronist political proposal which will not only be submitted to the other parties for consideration, but will also be sent to the armed forces.

Leading Idea

Bittel's inclusion in this group is, according to his adherents, an indication of what might be the leading idea in the proposal that is currently being studied. Bittel recently signed a document together with Eloy Prospero Camus, wherein an analysis of the Yacyreta problem afforded them an opportunity to expand upon their views of the institutional and political aspects of the overall situation. And it prompted them to claim that the problems of the times and the establishment of democracy require a solution based on the convergence of the armed forces and the people, "which has produced glorious results in the past." Hence, it is presumed that the basic idea in the announced Peronist political proposal cannot be other than this.

Contacts

When the proposal was announced, Bittel, who is the supreme authority in the Justicialist Party after Peron's widow, expanded his contacts both within his group and outside of it. He was recently hosted by the Club of 45, which includes those who were with Peron at the beginning of his political career; in other words, it contains the so-called "historical Peronists." Included among Bittel's hosts were Alfredo Gomez Morales, Col Maximo Renner, Raul Garre and Luis Pericas. Justicialist circles do not reject the notion that the dinner may have served to prepare for a rapprochement between Bittel and Raul Matera, who are said to be aloof from one another.

During the past few days, Bittel has also talked with members of the DAIA [Delegation of Argentine Jewish Associations] who met with him, headed by the chairman of this Israeli entity, Jerenias Rezniky. And he has received

representatives from the Socialist Confederation and from Victor Garcia Costa's Popular Socialist Party.

Reformulation?

Some Peronists have pointed out that Bittel's status in the party (to be more exact, mention is made of the status of the movement with which Bittel is affiliated) is becoming increasingly consolidated. It is also believed to be noted that as Bittel's group obtains greater adhesion from the Peronists cadres, the relations that this group has had with other parties are becoming more subject to terms. According to the opinions that have been gathered, it is not unlikely that there will be a reformulation of the multiparty understanding that has been encouraged thus far. The relations with the Communist Party, although only occasional, have earned criticism for Bittel. The effect that a potential excluding position on the part of the Peronists might have on the entire multiparty group remains to be seen.

Former Ambassador's Statements

Buenos Aires LA NACION in Spanish 14 Jun 79 p 26

[Text] Prof Americo Ghioaldi has called for a government system that includes the position of the prime minister, has rejected the idea of institutionalizing the presence of the armed forces in the government and has said that they should be controlled by the civilian authorities.

The former ambassador to Portugal and head of the Democratic Socialist Party spoke at the Argentine Engineers Center, where he discussed the topic "The Forthcoming Decade of the 1980's." The function was organized on the occasion of Ghioaldi's 80th birthday.

The speaker began by making a critical-historical examination of the national reality during recent decades; and, with regard to the one which will start in 1980, he posed this question: "Will the system of military governments be made official for 15 years or more, or will the new historical cycle be determined through the reestablishment of civilian types of Argentine institutions?"

In examining the prospects for the political and institutional future, he declared: "To throw a cloak over the system of political degeneration that has shaped the Argentine reality in recent decades would be to deprive ourselves of the major understanding required for national reorganization."

With regard to the forthcoming decade of the 1980's, Ghioaldi proposed two things: "1. To stabilize the political system; and 2, to promote the political integration of the forces which have deviated from the path of May."

The speaker expressed the view that "It is not advisable to have what has been termed the institutionalization of the armed forces." He added:

'The case of Portugal is not of use in dealing with the Argentine problem.' On the other hand, he defended "control of the armed forces by the civilian authorities."

Prime Minister

He maintained: "The parties must not wait for the government to devise a proposal; on the contrary, they should jointly prepare the foundations for a thorough solution." He stressed the fact that, "A solution should be interpreted as the proposal of a plan which will make it possible to return to the constitution, and to the institutional rate of 6 years, which marked the long period from 1860 to 1930." He cited the need for establishing "secure institutions" which will make coups d'etat unnecessary.

He suggested a change in the government system, or maintaining the presidential office in keeping with the nation's institutional tradition, but with the addition of the position of a prime minister, "whose appointment would be made in consideration of the election results."

Divergence Within PSU

Buenos Aires LA NACION in Spanish 13 Jun 79 p 26

[Text] Socialist unity and the presence of that political movement in a future national popular democratic front were reportedly the essential topics discussed at a dinner attended by national leaders of the Unified Socialist Party [PSU] a group directed by Simon Alberto Lazara.

Participating in the meeting with the latter were Alberto Gabetta, Marcelo O'Connor, Eduardo Esposito, Hector Vazquez, Gabriel Balcalo and Carlos Perez, among others.

On that occasion, it was reportedly decided to stress the negotiations aimed at unifying the many factions into which socialism is divided in Argentina. The activities carried out to date for this purpose of unity have made relatively significant progress. In most instances, this progress has materialized in declarations on the current national situation signed jointly by various socialist groups and other parties, such as the Justicialist, the Intransigent, those with a Christian Democratic affiliation, the Popular Conservative Party and, at times, the Communist Party.

Dividing Lines

But, the very relationship maintained with other political movements has, in the long run, been the factor that is now impeding socialist unity; because as progress was made in multiparty relations the different positions of the socialist groups have met with their own dividing lines.

During the dinner attended by the PSU's national leaders, it was reportedly concluded that the differences among socialists are not the result of the

rapprochement with certain other political parties, but are rather based on the fact that each socialist faction may possibly be practicing an adulterated type of socialism. In this connection, mention was reportedly made of the need to engage in an exercise of vindication, in order to discover the reasons which caused the great socialist division in the country, and to eliminate them with a return to the source.

At the meeting there was said to be no dearth of reflection on the fact that, up until now, the unity of socialists has proven equally difficult to attain if it is sought apart from an agreement with other parties or if an attempt is made to achieve it on the path toward that agreement.

According to reports, the PSU leaders maintained that the socialist movements must necessarily devise a proposal that will reflect the essence of socialism, so that this idea may recover its force and be assured an influential position among the democratic and popular parties which are attempting to find solutions for the nation's major problems through common accord.

In this regard, Lazara was quoted as saying that socialism must devise a proposal which will attest to its opposition to backing and commitments to the present government, and its approval of national agreement for a return to democracy, as well as its status as a defender of the labor movement and its unity.

FUFETO Reviews Strategy

Buenos Aires LA NACION in Spanish 19 Jun 79 p 10

[Text] The Popular Federalist Force [FUFETO] began a plenary meeting yesterday to examine its political strategy. This group, guided by centrist ideas, has lent its support to the terms of the national reorganization process. However, among its members there has been evidence of increasingly hard-line positions toward the action that the government has been taking in the economic area.

It seems obvious that, on this occasion, FUFETO will intensify the critical spirit that has marked its identification with the process; this will surely be summarized in a document that may be prepared during this plenary meeting which opened yesterday.

Moreover, the Federalists will attempt to make progress in their agreements with other political sectors, such as the Popular Line Party of Santa Fe and the Progressive Democratic Party. Representatives from both groups took part in the dialog during the first part of the plenary session, which is being chaired by the head of FUFETO, Dr Horacio Guzman.

It was learned that Dr Sylvestre Begnis, the head of Popular Line, was one of the participants in the Federalists' meeting, together with the members

f the Progressive Democratic Party, Alberto Natale, Jose Decara and Horacio Gilardoni.

Other topics which will be taken up on this occasion by the members of FUFEPO are the establishment of a foundation for political and social studies, and the publication of a magazine which would be a vehicle for the Federalist philosophy.

The discussions continued until late yesterday.

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BOLIVIA

ELECTION PROCESS ENTERS A DEFINING STAGE

La Paz EL DIARIO in Spanish 12 Apr 79 p 1

[Text] Another important legal-political stage in the election process will be completed within a week when it is finally known how many political parties, alone or forming alliances or fronts, will participate in the general elections of 1 July.

According to the calendar, 20 April is the deadline for the various political organizations to write to the National Electoral Court for giving official notice of participation in the elections and being respectively included in the single multicolored and multisymbol ballot which will be used in the country for the first time.

For this purpose and in order to fully instruct the political parties as to how they must announce their participation, the National Electoral Court has published a series of procedural regulations to which they must adhere.

Thus it is known that the parties are not required to submit documents again, as was the case for requesting recognition of legal capacity, but only to give notice that they will participate in the elections.

If alliances, fronts or coalitions are involved, each may suggest that the name, initials and symbol of some of the constituent parties be included in the multicolored and multisymbol ballot or either the name, initials and symbols serving as the joint identification for the front, alliance or coalition. In those cases bearing close similarity to other candidacies, the National Electoral Court will settle the matter in performance of its authority.

The petition for inclusion on the ballot and consequent right to participate in the elections will be signed by all leaders of parties comprising the front or coalition. The agreement mentioned by Article 220 (new) of the Election Law must likewise be signed by the party leader when single-party candidacies are involved and jointly and severally by all party leaders when there is a coalition.

The Court will in turn establish uniform standards for the symbol, initials and image of the candidate, to be superimposed on the multicolored ballot.

Once colors have been assigned to each of the parties which will participate in the elections, the order of candidates on the ballots will be decided by lot. It may be recalled that the drawing will not include those candidates who have not first signed the respective agreement with the General Office of the Controller of the Republic.

Political parties will not be authorized to print ballots, as this is the responsibility of the National Electoral Court. A type of ballot not valid for voting, but intended for civic edification, will be issued. That high body will likewise be responsible for seeing that ballots reach all election boards in due time.

In June the Court will implement an intensive program of publication and instruction concerning the use of the multicolored and multisymbol ballot.

Expectations

In the meantime, there are expectations in political circles of finding out the number of parties and fronts which will participate in the election. A decisive question in this respect is Article 220 of the Election Law, which establishes an aliquot portion for each participating candidate, based on the total cost of the process, which to date has reached 30 million pesos.

For example, this means that if there are 10 participating candidates, those not receiving a minimum of 50,000 votes will be subject to a fine of 3 million pesos each, whereas those receiving more than 50,000 votes will be exempt from any payment.

The following candidates are considered definite thus far: those sponsored by the MNR [National Revolutionary Movement] Alliance, PDC [Christian Democratic Party], FRI [Leftist Revolutionary Front], PRA [Authentic Revolutionary Party], MRTK [expansion unknown], UDP [the People's Democratic Union front], ADN [Democratic Nationalist Action], Bolivian Socialist Falange; the groups led by General Rene Bernal and others by Dr Adolfo Siles; finally, there are leftist organizations which have not yet endorsed any candidate.

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BOLIVIA

PAPER EDITORIALIZES ON UNCERTAINTY, INSTABILITY

Government's Evasive Reporting Criticized

La Paz EL DIARIO in Spanish 15 Apr 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Uncertainty"]

[Text] An evasive, uncertain and vague language is starting to become one of the daily customs of our country, failing to describe current situations and events with the intelligibility which is essential when matters of public interest are involved. This approach, which some may assume satisfies and does not excite public opinion, contains all the elements of confusion and instead gives rise to rumor which circulate extremely fast, exaggerating and distorting the facts.

Very confusing and sometimes even contradictory statements were recently made in regard to some reports by government authorities concerning subversive plots. If such conditions really do exist, there is no recourse other than to tell the complete although unpleasant truth, since if that matter is confirmed, the situation cannot immediately be officially interpreted as involving "some bad experts" among army officers and that some are not duly complying with regulations. This is much worse than putting the cards on the table and showing the country the real depth or insignificance of the events, and not in a circumscribed manner, but openly and directly.

This discreet way of addressing the nation, however, is not confined to politics. The same thing happens in the case of matters involving the national economy and government projects. Clear and articulate language is used very rarely.

It was recently said that the republic's current crisis is due to the "immobility" of recent months, i.e., to the periods corresponding to the governments which assumed national leadership in July and November. It is very hard to accept that criterion as plausible, since there were no activities in that period which could seriously jeopardize or damage the economy as a whole. Moreover, those required to explain these events also use an ambiguous style of communication, as though they were afraid of assuming responsibility or offering explanations which could result in personal or collective disadvantages.

On the other hand, it has also been observed that many of those who have conducted public business have chosen to be silent, an unfortunate demonstration of a desire to be excused from duties or obligations deserving an appropriate explanation.

With respect to large political groups, it must also be remembered that it is their duty to express an opinion and not to reserve viewpoints for other occasions. Democracy entails risks. The view that it is better to be silent than to make a mistake is not advisable conduct for those claiming to be interpreters of vast sectors of the citizenry.

What must be established is whether that deep silence or those half-truths, which occur when mistakes or poor administrative conduct are discussed, are due to a long absence of democratic action, to commitments made or to the fear that answers might reveal incompetent behavior.

In any case, we find ourselves in the midst of uncertainties which are not beneficial for the morale of the community.

Nation's 'Tarnished Image' Viewed

La Paz EL DIARIO in Spanish 15 Apr 79 p 2

[Editorial: "The Most Unstable Nation"]

[Text] On a previous occasion, we referred to that type of masochism characterizing certain circles which delight in depicting the country as one which can attest to 200 revolutions in the course of its independent existence. The recurrent frequency of the figure has been transformed into a living image of Bolivia. Logically, there have been approximately 1.3 revolutions per year in slightly more than a century and a half, which is not patently true.

We should remember Mr Nicolas Aranzaes, who in 1918 published his book "The Revolutions in Bolivia," which gives a full account of events of that type occurring in the country since the insurrection of the Squadron of Grenadiers in Cochabamba on 14 November 1926. In any case, the idea of so much unrest, rebellion, rioting or rash attempts, in addition to strikes, trade union and university disputes, student demonstrations, temporary courts and street fighting have left foreigners with a regrettable mental picture of our country.

We will not try to reduce or to lessen the importance of many political scandals, some of them very recent, and try to show the unreal image of a community with an advanced political culture, but neither can we close our eyes when this country is judged with harsh severity from abroad. General elections were held last year and to the surprise of foreigners and ourselves, the people went to the polls in an exemplary manner. There were no disturbances of public order and the citizenry behaved in a civilized and adult way. It is this fact and the civic behavior of Bolivian men and women that we want to protect and safeguard at this time. It is not the country which is unstable, but rather pressure groups and political elements which alter its choices, i.e., its elections.

A mexican newspaper entitled UNO MAS UNO has just published an editorial analyzing Bolivia, which we have reprinted, and lists it as the most unstable country in Latin America, a situation attributed to its many internal contradictions. The newspaper mentions six military coups, "almost all bloodless," which have occurred since 1964 and refers to the recent subversive process reported by the government.

In view of the circumstances, it may be said that the loss of Bolivia's prestige, with respect to political responsibility, is the work of its own citizens: sometimes shamelessly pointing out faults, with journalists not checking those damaging statistics and helping to represent this nation as an Indian camp lacking responsibility. Other "men of circumstances" show an unrestrained appetite for the pleasures of power and, of course, there are the groups of courtiers who think that reaching the level of national government is also a way to divide up the spoils.

It is certain and undeniable that we have an internationally tarnished image and that it will take a lot of work to raise the awareness of the country's ruling circles and to convince them that prestige must be won domestically, even if this means waging diplomatic battles and solving the serious problems which have existed for a century.

Perhaps the election of its public officials, through the upcoming popular vote in June, could be the point of departure for carving an image of respectability.

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BRAZIL

THOSE EXCLUDED, BENEFITING FROM AMNESTY BILL DETAILED

More Than 600 Excluded

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 28 Jun 79 p 5

[Text] More than 600 persons convicted of crimes against national security will not be benefited by the amnesty bill sent to Congress yesterday. Among them are 98 guilty of bank assaults, 466 sentenced for kidnaping and terrorist acts and 6 for personal assaults. These figures, furnished by the military courts, refer to sentences passed between March 1964 and December 1978, although there is no data as to how many are still in prison.

On the other hand, 657 convicted of crimes against the national security--including 136 charged with assault, kidnaping and terrorism who are missing or fugitives--will be benefited by amnesty. In addition, those who were banished--now numbering about 600--will benefit, even though they committed the same crimes, because banishment closed their court cases. This contradiction caused unfavorable reaction among civilian and military STM [Superior Military Court] judges, who considered it unfair to differentiate among persons who had committed the same crime.

STM Concepts Vary

The definitions given by Superior Military Court judges about each of the crimes excluded by the amnesty bill sent to Congress yesterday differed in their basic concepts. Thus, one who practiced terrorism was defined as he who "placed bombs in crowded places and who by his action caused injury to innocent persons." The example cited was that of terrorists who planted a bomb at Guararapes Airport in Recife intended for the entourage of former President Costa e Silva and which ultimately killed or maimed several other persons. But, according to the military, terrorists are all those who subvert order and jeopardize national security for political purposes. This crime is covered in Articles 11 and 12 of LSN [National Security Law] 898 (the former version), which determines that a terrorist is anyone "who jeopardizes national security by sabotaging any military installations, ships, aircraft, materiel used by the armed forces or means of communication and lines of transportation, shipyards, airports, depots or other facilities."

The crime of assault is covered in Article 27 of that decree: "Assaulting, robbing or looting a credit establishment, for whatever motive"; and "if the act results in death" the prescribed sentence was 10 to 20 years. Law No 6620 changed the sentence to 2 to 30 years. Agreement about the crime of assault is unanimous and the court now has no doubts about its definition. Article 28 of Decree 898/79 [sic, 69?], which, in addition to robbery, covers the practice of personal assault, massacre, sabotage or terrorism, is also plainly understood by the court. Even so, some judges predicted that doubts will be raised when many of those convicted as codefendants in such crimes will be able to lodge appeals for a precise definition of the crimes for which they were convicted, since such exceptions now declared by the amnesty bill did not previously signify for the convicted person a different number of years to be served in prison.

The crime of personal assault, for which six persons were specifically convicted during the period of 1964 through December 1978, was defined by Judge Gualter Goulinho as "that which is not directed at an organization or corporation, but at a person." The attorney general of the military courts, Milton Menezes, has said that he finds difficulty in clearly defining the crime of personal assault because he believes it involves different situations and various practices that lead to the final act of assault.

The articles covering the crime of personal assault in Law 898/69 are 32, 33, 35, 37 and the aforementioned Article 28. These articles impose a sentence that varies from 12 years of imprisonment to the death penalty. Judge Bierrenbach recalled that he voted for the death penalty in the case of the terrorist Tomochenko last year for his having killed in cold blood a merchant who had recognized him during an assault on an establishment. The other case of conviction cited by the judges was that in which the victim was an American captain, a situation covered in Article 37 of Decree-Law No 898/69, which provides the death penalty for anyone who "commits violence against a foreigner who is in Brazil serving his nation, on a study mission or at the invitation of the Brazilian government" and "if the violence results in death."

The presiding judge of the Superior Military Court as well as the attorney general of the military courts yesterday deplored the lack of precise data about all the cases tried by the military courts. The causes, according to them, are in the archaic operating procedure of the jurisdictions and the court itself, which at times, when asked for information about cases in which a defendant is being tried in different jurisdictions, does not have a record, even when the case has gone through the STM. Thus it is that Gen Rodrigo Octavio stated that there were 1,100 persons at large who had been convicted of crimes of bank assault but who had not yet been given definitive sentences.

History

The first step in amnesty, according to the contention expressed yesterday by several Superior Military Court judges, was already taken in Gen Ernesto Geisel's administration, when he sent to the National Congress the bill for the current National Security Law, No 6620. For the judges who applied the old LSN and today are adjusting sentences from 12 to the current law, the reduction of the penalty from one to the other amounts to a commutation to the extent that, for example, the crime covered by Article 28 of Law No 898/69 prescribed a sentence that varied from 12 to 30 years' imprisonment, whereas the new law provides for 2 to 12 years of confinement. They cited other specific examples experienced by the STM of cases of sentencing to 24 years, as required in Article 28, and which with the required adjustment were reduced to 4 years' imprisonment. Even for common bank robbers--those who committed assault without any political connotation, being included in Article 27 of the old Law No 898/69, for which the minimum prison term was 10 years and the maximum 24 years--the STM, in the large majority, has authorized application of the common penal code, in its Article 157, and has adjusted its penalties, for example, from 10 years to 6 years.

5,300 to Receive Amnesty

The national press adviser for Planalto Palace, Alexandre Garcia, revealed yesterday that the government's amnesty bill should benefit approximately 5,300 persons within the scope of federal administration alone. He stressed that the measure only excluded those charged with terrorism who were convicted by the courts, because those who committed crimes of the same nature but who have not yet been tried will receive amnesty.

In regard to this last aspect, Alexandre Garcia said that President Figueiredo did not make a decision about cases pending trial and the defendant will thus receive the benefit of the doubt, as is the universal law. This situation includes mainly those who had been banished and whose cases, closed as a result of banishment, were reopened when the punishment was rescinded. And they will be benefited even if charged with mortal crimes, Garcia emphasized.

The press adviser stressed that the fact that the bill excludes those convicted does not prevent their being benefited in the future by other judicial or legal measures such as surcease, parole or pardon.

Meanwhile, Justice Minister Petronio Portella said that the "connected crimes" mentioned in Paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the amnesty bill "were intended to benefit those who were indirectly involved as collaborators in political crimes or who were associated with terrorists without the intention or objective of committing criminal acts."

After denying that Paragraph 2 of Article 1--which deals with terrorism--had been changed at the last minute, Portella stressed that the concept of terrorism expressed there originates in Article 27 of the old National Security Law and refers to those who assaulted, robbed or looted credit

establishments or financial institutions for whatever motive and that they are subject to penalties of from 10 to 24 years.

In regard to government employees affected by amnesty, the justice minister explained that they will all be benefited, without any exception, making groundless the apprehensions that those whose employment contracts are governed by the CLT [Consolidated Labor Laws] would be excluded.

The amnesty bill sent to Congress is much more restrictive than the text delivered to the president by the justice minister and even more restrictive than what some of the most highly-placed presidential advisers wanted. The text of Paragraph 2 of Article 1 at first excluded from amnesty only those convicted "for committing crimes of kidnaping, assault and terrorism that resulted in death." Had this reading been retained, Portella expected that less than 100 would not have been granted amnesty.

Planalto Palace began to think about broadening the bill even more and, during the first few days after the preliminary draft was delivered to the president, high officials tried to see if they could find a way of extending the benefit even to terrorists who had not participated directly in mortal crimes. This is perhaps why reports began to surface to the effect that only 30 or 40 persons would be excluded from amnesty.

The complete reversal of position took place after President Figueiredo met at the end of last week with Army Minister Walter Pires and Navy Minister Maximiano Fonseca (Air Minister Delio Jardim de Mattos was away) to discuss the draft of the bill.

Monday and Tuesday indications began to arise in Planalto Palace that the president would restrict the coverage proposed by Portella and the text was sent to Congress yesterday. Although essentially retaining the preliminary draft written by the justice minister, it made a substantial modification in Paragraph 2 of Article 1, excluding from amnesty those convicted "for committing crimes of terrorism, assault, kidnaping and personal assault." The number excluded thus increased to about 200, according to an estimate made by Patrônio Portella himself.

In Brasilia, Chief Justice Luiz Vicente Cernicchiaro of the Federal District Court of Justice, considered an authority on amnesty, said that this measure "is a sort of annulment of criminality, inasmuch as juridically it erases the penal consequences of the crime that, from this point of view, is as if it had never been committed."

Moderate View Prevails

Sac Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 28 Jun 79 p 5

[Text] The final version of the amnesty bill, the speech by President Figueiredo and the message accompanying the bill to Congress, if viewed as

a whole, dispel many doubts and demonstrate that, judging by the unanimity of remarks made in political circles, the moderate view has predominated in the government. The measure was not so broad as had been expected and even as revised just a few days ago, but, on the other hand, not so restrictive as certain groups wanted.

This conclusion is borne out in Paragraph 2 of Article 1, which ultimately excluded from amnesty all those "found guilty of committing crimes of terrorism, robbery, kidnaping and criminal assault." The position that only those who committed "crimes of kidnaping, assault and terrorism resulting in death" should be deprived of benefit was defeated. The difference is distinct, since, for example, those who committed bank holdups and kidnapings without their actions having resulted in death will not be granted amnesty. Thus, in the version eventually approved, at least 300 terrorists or subversives will remain in prison or subject to imprisonment, should they return to Brazil, whereas in the other case only 20 or 30 would have remained without freedom. Gen Joao Baptista Figueiredo let the debate over this point go on until the evening before the formal announcement of amnesty, took no position and let his advisers express their views exhaustively. In this case the thinking of the more rigid camp, which prevails in the Army, won out over the other view which, unless we are mistaken, was advocated by Air Minister Delio Jardim de Mattos and Petronio Portella himself, and by parliamentary leaders as well. The latter wanted to limit the exclusion even more; which is to say, to broaden amnesty as much as possible.

The hard line also won out in regard to the issue of whether or not former civilian and military public servants now granted amnesty should receive back pay. Planning Minister Mario Henrique Simonsen, without intruding, announced that the cost to the national treasury could be absorbed easily and would not force the nation into bankruptcy, and, here too, Petronio Portella and Delio Jardim de Mattos, among others did not win. It appears that they advocated, with amnesty, payment of arrearages, not only transformation of pensions into retirement pay, for those who are reinstated, or payments commensurate with their duties, from now on, in the other case. The nonpayment of arrearages established in Article 6 acts as a kind of punishment or at least serves to demonstrate that the past has not been completely blotted out for those granted amnesty. That reservation was very important to the military.

On the other side of the coin is a victory of the more liberal over the more strict, and in a crucial aspect of the debates: the return or reinstatement to active duty of civilian and military government employees receiving amnesty. For many weeks this option was considered inadmissible, especially in the Army, not only for the embarrassment it could cause but also for the changes and difficulties created in the roster of promotions for those who are now on active duty. It was asserted that prohibition of reinstatement for previously-dismissed military personnel should be part of the bill. But Articles 2 and 3 permit return or reinstatement to active duty, except for cases of dismissal due to the officials' dishonesty and as long as "there is a vacancy or an administrative benefit." Obviously, it will not

be easy for the great majority of cassated or disciplined military to return, if they wish to do so, depending upon the recommendations of the commissions created in the respective ministries, but what is important is the principle, the possibility of being able to return created by the law. Those in the Air Force who suppose that former Captain Sergio ("macaco"), of the Paraser case, will be reinstated are not far wrong, although in the grade he held when discharged, despite the fact that his military classmates have become colonels.

In reaching this decision, the views of General Figueiredo must have weighed heavily, views that are emotionally related to the harsh treatment received by his father, Col Euclides Figueiredo. There could have been no other meaning to the phrase he uttered in his speech when mentioning "the soldiers removed from their fatherland and from their service because of political offenses."

There was particular unanimity in regard to excluding those discharged for corruption, who may not return to their former duties, if only because the revolution, which fought against subversion and corruption, may turn back from the first of these basic positions, but never from the other.

There are yet other essential aspects of the president's speech and message: It is clear that the hand he is extending, although not empty, permits all those tried and convicted for political offenses who are now abroad to return and be reinstated in political activity. From Leonel Brizola to Luis Carlos Prestes, from Miguel Arraes to Francisco Juliao and Marcio Moreira Alves, all of them have the prospect of returning to political activity, without restriction, although in referring to the revolution and its purposes and concepts, General Figueiredo has implied that the law is still quite available to curb excesses.

Yesterday, "on the happiest day of his life," as the president said to his brother, a cycle ended that began 31 March 1964, for even during the period when the 1967 constitution was fully in effect--from 15 March of that year to 13 December 1968, when Institutional Act No 5 was decreed--the effects of previous convictions continued in effect. From now on, although the military movement continues, it is as an idea and an inspiration, its cycle completely finished.

Nor did the president's words about the importance of avoiding prolonging the traumatic process . . . ended, an idea he rounded out by stressing: "About certain events . . . best to remain silent, for the sake of keeping peace in the Brazilian family." If we are not mistaken, the reference is to excesses committed by one side as well as by the other, the actions of the subversives as well as the abuses of the repressive apparatus. In his message Figueiredo amplified this idea, writing that the amnesty bill avoids prolonging a process that would certainly for a long time traumatize society with the knowledge of events that should be buried for the sake of keeping peace.

Military Are Pleased

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 28 Jun 79 p 7

[Text] While Army Minister Gen Walter Pires and Air Force Minister Gen Delio Jardim de Matos yesterday were praising the amnesty bill sent by the government to Congress, Navy Minister Adm Maximiano Fonseca preferred not to express himself about the measure, asserting that he had done so on several occasions and had nothing to add.

"I look upon amnesty as any Brazilian; moreover, as a minister of the government, which is a team, if I did not consider it good, I would not participate in it," said Gen Walter Pires. The air minister had already asserted that he foresaw no difficulties in the bill's path, "because the amnesty recommended to Congress is much broader than what the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement] was expecting."

Air Force Gen Delio Jardim de Matos stressed that new and broader measures will be taken after the government bill, "and more persons will benefit in the future. President Figueiredo is a man who understands amnesty much better than we, because he endured the problem in his own life. His father was cassated and exiled and he thus is much more devoted to the problem than the rest of us."

Shortly before going to Planalto Palace to attend the ceremony of the amnesty bill's signature by the president of the republic, the air minister received in his office Air Force Gen Joao Paulo Burnier, who was head of the Air Force Intelligence Center at the time of the Parasar episode, which culminated in the retirement of Capt Sergio Miranda.

Burnier talked privately with the air minister for about 20 minutes and left the Air Ministry building by a private elevator without speaking to newsmen. Officers associated with General Burnier and the airminister's staff declined to reveal the reasons for the meeting.

Another military man, a general officer, noted yesterday in Brasilia that "the amnesty bill responds to the wishes of the military class and there is a consensus on this, especially because the armed forces retain control over reinstatement of convicted military personnel, depending upon its administrative expedience." That officer stressed the military's full support for the government bill and the difficulty of knowing how many military men will request reinstatement to active duty. "Naturally," he said, "the Army can reabsorb this one or that--the bill creates this possibility--but everything will depend upon a case-by-case study."

Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen Samuel Alves Correa, in turn, announced that he also supports the government bill, "prepared with all generosity and sincerity." Asked about the possibilities of cassated former leaders such as Arraes and Brizola eventually stirring up the national political

scene, the general replied, "We are not afraid of apparitions. Should any apparition take material form, it will be dealt with."

Second Army Commander Gen Jose Fragomeni also expressed himself favorably about the government bill, adding that this measure, coupled with Brazil's past history, "is imperative for the unity of all the people."

General Fragomeni made that statement during a visit to the Assembly, where he went to say farewell, since he will leave command of the 2d Army to fill a vacancy on the Superior Military Court. He stressed that amnesty should not benefit those involved in crimes of bloodshed, but should be extended to the military, examined case by case.

There have been no comments about the bill from the 3rd Army command, but according to a military source, "it was well received, which would not have happened if the pure and simple reinstatement of convicted military personnel had been assured."

In Rio de Janeiro, Gen Hugo Abreu, former chief of the president's military household, refused to "discuss the amnesty bill in detail," but pointed out that "to promote general pacification of the nation it must be broad and total." However, he acknowledged that the bill "is a first step in the direction of amnesty and should be approved."

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COLOMBIA

A THREE-PART HISTORY OF THE FARC

Growth of FARC Viewed

Bogota EL TIEMPO 24 May 79 pp 1-A, 2-A

[Text] We are publishing today the first in a series of three articles on the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), in which an attempt is made to demonstrate the unusual growth of this subversive group in recent years, the chain of assaults, crimes, and abductions that it has committed throughout the country, and its means of support.

A wretched and fateful aura of ambushes, abductions, murders of defenseless peasants, and the killing of the country's worthy soldiers surrounds the history of the FARC, the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia.

The readers of the press began to see the FARC initials many years ago. In the beginning, however, that subversive organization carried out only limited actions in the countryside, without any major incidence on the general public order.

But the FARC has now become important and, by means of eight fighting fronts spread over extensive areas of the country, have succeeded even in ousting almost all of the other groups that were fighting in the mountains.

In the excessive growth of the FARC one unquestionably sees the unmistakable hand of international communism.

This predominance of subversion in the political field seems to reflect in part the victory of the USSR in the Sino-Soviet ideological struggle and

the intensification of the Cuban regime's development of its new policy of rapprochement with other American countries and its abandonment—however transitory and apparent—of "exportation" of the Cuban revolution.

The dominance of the FARC in rural areas converted the (pro-Castro) ELN [National Liberation Army] into a sort of revolutionary corpse and forced the (pro-China) EPL [Popular Liberation Army] to circumscribe its operations to frequent, but innocuous, blows (from the military point of view) in cities.

The building up of the FARC appeared to begin a little after the ELN's Anori military catastrophic occurrence, when its foremost men succumbed physically or were captured in one of the most spectacular anti-guerrilla operations known in Colombia.

In October 1973, when the Anori slaughter took place and the slow agony of the ELN began, the FARC were no more than a small group of former fighters of the period of Colombian violence who had become strong in the "independent republics" of El Pato, Guayabero, and Marquetalia.

After the Anori operation, the loss of ELN members, the military defection of Fabio Vasquez Castano, the capture of Ricardo Lara Parada, and the loss of National Liberation Army funds, the ELN's hope of revival came with the appearance of Alonso and Elias Ojeda Awad. They were the command's replacement for the dismantled soldiers.

Nevertheless, Vasquez Castano had made a deep impression on the ELN. The new figures did not become rooted in the armed rural struggle, in spite of their presence in sites of conflict such as those that they established in the Cesar department, after leaving the Magdalena Medio area, traditional bastion of the guerrillas.

History of the FARC

The FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, were not called that in the beginning.

After the general amnesty to guerrillas, proclaimed by Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in 1953, there were groups of former fighters who were not included in the measure. Many of them grouped themselves in the areas of El Pato, Marquetalia, and Guayabero, where they formed the so-called "independent republics." Even though they did not carry out combat actions, they began to instruct the inhabitants of the rural areas under their influence through the "Rural Self-Defenses." They established a sort of systematic training among the rural young people, whom they prepared for the struggle.

The "Rural Self-Defenses" formed recruitment groups. They travelled over vast areas in the southern part of Tolima and the northeastern part of Huila in a tireless campaign of political indoctrination. Among the visible leaders of those unarmed preachers of the revolution were: Fermin Charry (renowned enemy of the regular army during the period of the old rural guerrilla conflicts, known as "Charro Negro"); Isauro Llosa, who later died in combat as commander of one of the fronts of the FARC; and Pedro Antonio Marin, or Manuel Marulanda, who later was to become famous through the alias of "Tirofijo" and who has been supreme commander of the FARC up to the present.

But, in the same area and as a cooperator of the regular army, a former guerrilla fighter of Tolima, nicknamed "Mariachi," acted as "peacemaker" in the area. The latter saw to the removal of "Charro Negro." Then the single "Tirofijo" headquarters were established, later to become the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

At about that same period--1960--the Ninth Congress of the Colombian Communist Party was held in Bogota. One of the chief decisions of the meeting was the turning about of the system that had been carried out up to that time by the "Rural Self-Defenses." A change in tactics was ordered, from instruction to that of armed frontal fighting.

During two or three years, the military actions of the "Rural Self-Defenses" were limited to simply wandering through the mountains and slopes of the "independent republics" and an occasional attack against isolated police and army posts. It was a question mainly of slowly and patiently obtaining the experience, equipment, and uniforms needed to carry out more important military actions.

The event that manifested the fighting capability of the fanatics of the "Rural Self-Defenses" to the Colombian army was the ambush of a military outpost at the end of 1963. On this occasion the army suffered more than 20 casualties--between soldiers, officers, and subofficers--and lost all of their equipment. The patrol was decimated.

This action taught the army that what had seemed to be a romantic adventure with respect to the training of peasants was in reality a potential enemy of unsuspected proportion. The high military commands and the government then ordered the "Marquetalia Operation." By land and air a fierce attack was carried out against entrenched enemies who finally had to abandon their positions and make their way into the interior of the mountains of Tolima, Quindio, Valle, Caldas, Cauca, Meta, and Caqueta.

Emergence of the FARC

The "Rural Self-Defenses" then began to operate in various places in the southern part of the country--in a disorderly and anarchical manner. But

In 1966, in a not yet established place, the "First Guerrilla Conference of the Southern Bloc" was held. The following participated in it: led by Manuel Marulanda "Tirofijo," known also as Pedro Antonio Marin--the guerrilla chiefs--Ciro Trujillo, Jacobo Arenas, and Isauro Llosa--who had taken under their command the dispersed groups that had survived the "Marquetalia Operation."

It was at this meeting that the organization named "Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC," was born. The military staff and the Central Committee of Chiefs were established. A group that was named "military committee" (Commil)--a coordinating political-military organization for urban operations--was also formed. Its obligations included that of preparing the supply sources from cities for the insurrectionist groups in the mountains.

In this high guerrilla mountain summit mobile groups were established: "Comando Huila," "Comando Caqueta," "Comando Camilo Torres," and "Comando Isaias Pardo." They were assigned a reconnaissance mission for each of the locations where future attacks were to take place; that is, they were the same as intelligence battalions of the Colombian army.

The deliberations of the "guerrilla summit" ended in the establishment of the "Fourth Front of the FARC," whose base was to be in the Magdalena Medio area. In this manner they filled the void left years before by the members of the ELN, who had gone to Cesar under the command of the Ojeda Awad brothers.

Up to that time--end of 1966--the FARC were operating on three fronts, located respectively in Caqueta and Putumayo, Huila and northern Caqueta, and the remainder of Huila, Tolima, and Meta. The new "Fourth Front" operated in the departments of Boyaca, Santander, Antioquia, and part of Cundinamarca. There were very ambitious plans for it. It was put under the command of Ricardo Franco, alias "El Teniente Franco," advised by Marcelino Trujillo and Emiliano Guzman Daza, second and third in the hierarchy.

Next instalment: Organization of the fronts. Men and equipment. More fronts are established. Area of FARC influence.

The Mortal Aftermath of Communism

Bogota EL TIEMPO in Spanish 25 May 79 pp 1-A, 1-C

[Text] In the proliferation of the new fronts of the FARC; in the increase in their members and equipment; in the mastery that they have demonstrated in many of their operations--chiefly in ambushes and abductions--one clearly sees the hand of international communism.

When the FARC consisted merely of four small fronts that very sporadically attacked almost defenseless towns and small military and police outposts, they unquestionably were operating according to the patterns of the makeshift guerrilla groups of the former violence.

But beginning with the Ninth Congress of the Colombian Communist Party in 1960, the commands and the basic cadres initiated an improvement program and a system of training and of actions in which the communist experience obtained in various countries throughout the world was applied..

The rude ambushes of some years before and the occasional abductions of other periods changed little by little. Details were so highly perfected and abductions became so technically precise as to reach the point of those carried out against the former consul of Holland in Cali, Eric Leupin, and the North American scientist, Richard Starr.

The intelligence services of the miliatry forces traced the course of the FARC, which in the first years grew slowly--in contrast to the unusual recent increase in their fighting potential.

In 1975, the intelligence services appraised the FARC as a relatively modest organization, based on five fronts with their respective areas of influence, some few men, and an amount of fighting equipment which apparently was not enough to arm all of the men.

Result of the Communist Experience

Under these circumstances, the bands of armed men who attacked towns and police posts did so chiefly in search of new equipment and without any definite strategic objective. They were attacks for purely logistics reasons and for self-provisionment.

The five FARC fronts that existed in 1975 had definite areas of influence, but their magnitude was such that they did not succeed in greatly worrying the forces of order. (Even now, although the eight present fronts are a relatively serious problem for public order, the FARC do not represent an immediate danger for institutions, according to what the high military commands have reiterated.)

The commander of the first front during that period—and still the present commander—was Pedro Antonio Marin, alias "Tirofijo;" his deputy was Noel Mata. The areas of influence of this group were the municipalities of Guayabero, Valsillas, Guacamayas, Campolegre, and San Vicente del Caguan, under the jurisdiction of the department of Huila and the provinces of Putumayo and Caqueta.

The second front was commanded by Rigoberto Lozada Perdomo, alias "Joselo;" the deputy commander was Miguel Pascuas. It operated in Dolores, Planadas,

Ataco, Chaparral, Prado, Iquira, in the departments of Tolima and northern Huila, and a small part of Caqueta.

Asnoraldo Betancur, the renowned "Balin," and his deputy, Ramiro Camacho, commanded the third front with an area of influence in Corinto, Toribio, Miranda, and Buenos Aires, in the Cauca department.

The fourth group was commanded by Marcelino Trujillo; the second in command was Emiliano Guzman Daza. It operated in part of the Magdalena Medio, Cimitarra, Puerto Boyaca, Jesus Maria, Otanche, and Puerto Salgar, in the departments of Boyaca and Santander.

The fifth and last front of the period was commanded by Nestor Arenas, alias "Capitan Paez." Its area of influence was located in the northern part of Antioquia: Uraba, Arboletes, San Pedro de Uraba, Apartado, Chigorodo, and Turbo.

According to the estimates of the intelligence services, the FARC in 1975 had less than 300 men, with less than 200 weapons for their fighting and ambushes.

The first front had between 80 and 90 men; the second, 50; the third, 45; the fourth, between 40 and 50; and the fifth, no more than 50 fighters.

The total equipment of all these men, according to the army secret services, was limited to 4 machine guns, 9 M-1 guns, 27 Punto-30 guns, 21 7-millimeter guns, 16 M-1 carbines, 18 San Cristobal carbines, 22 M-2 carbines, 8 22-caliber carbines, 2 Madsen machine guns (now obsolete), 2 M-3 submachine guns, and 28 short-range weapons, including pistols and revolvers of various calibers.

In 1975, the bands of armed men of the FARC seemed more like groups of ragged and dirty peasants than guerrilla organizations. Many of them wore hemp sandals and Indian sandals; they wore serapes, ponchos, and peasant outfits. Very few--almost always chiefs--wore military boots and uniforms stolen from the bodies of soldiers fallen in conflict.

The five fronts, in spite of the rudimentary nature of their organization, had training centers located in the regions of Viota, the so-called Fourth Zone of Cundinamarca; Tierradentro, in Cauca; Puerto Boyaca, within the limits of Huila and Tolima; and the department of Meta.

The veteran personnel was in charge of training, which included knowledge of weapons, indoctrination and ideology, instruction in fighting tactics, and knowledge of terrain. Their communication systems included high frequency radios, very similar, and at times superior, to those used by the Armed Forces, with signals through reflectors and mirrors and other articles located in trees.

The FARC in 1979

In contrast to the halting and almost rustic organization of years before, the FARC in 1979 have the appearance of a corps that is dynamic and fast and, militarily, with great fighting possibilities.

Present estimates indicate that the eight operational fronts in as many regions of the country have at least tripled their number of armed men. The areas of influence of the five initial fronts have expanded. Abductions are carried out with forethought to the smallest of details. The ambushes against regular troops have a high index of effectiveness. The guerrilla fighters, formerly poorly dressed and with even poorer equipment, all have high quality military uniforms and equipment.

In 1975, there were new fighting fronts which, added to the previous ones, cover the territory of almost the entire country.

The Sixth Front of the FARC emerged in 1976. It was commanded by Luis Ernesto Vasquez Londono, "Capitan Tranquilo." It has been one of the most active and has approximately 50 men. Its area of influence is in southern and northern Tolima, up to the Cauca department and a part of Valle department.

Later, in the area of the Sierra de la Macarena, in the Meta department, the Seventh Front made its appearance, under the command of the alias, "Trujillo." It has about 100 men and included among its most spectacular actions the abduction of the North American, Richard Starr.

The Eighth Front is commanded by Jose Antonio Florez Cortes, "Alonso." It operates in the territory of Arauca and northern Boyaca and has approximately 60 fighters.

The militants of the FARC have made progress not only in the fields of logistics and fighting, but also in the quality of their members. Although the base is made up of peasants for the most part, they have received political indoctrination of such magnitude that they are able to carry out proselytism campaigns by means of harangues and discourses when they capture towns.

In addition to the fighting groups, the majority of the bands of armed men have medical and first aid services staffed by professionals and nurses who live within the guerrilla program.

Military Staff

The FARC military staff has its headquarters in the Sumapaz area. It is headed by the leaders of the eight fronts, who at present are: Pedro Antonio Marin, alias "Trofijo"; Rigoberto Lozada Perdomo, "Joselo"; Anoraldo Betancur Ocampo, "Balin"; Ricardo Franco, "Teniente Franco"; Luis Enrique

Tuberquia Osorio, "Wilsor"; Luis Ernesto Vasquez Londono, "Capitan Tranquilo"; Marcelino Trujillo, "Capitan Trujillo"; and Jose Antonio Florez Cortes, "Alonso."

Each of the FARC fronts is led by a commander and a deputy commander, in addition to a chief of squad for each group of between 20 and 25 men. The hierarchy of the chiefs of squad thus equals that of subofficer in the regular army.

The expansion of the FARC, according to plans ascertained by military intelligence, does not appear to have reached its goal. For its present activities, the Fourth Front has expanded its area of influence to places like Yacopi, La Palma, and Guadero, in Cundinamarca. Short range expansions are oriented to the establishment of various vanguard mobile units and the establishment of another two fronts, that would give them a coverage of almost the entire Colombian territory.

Next installment: Abductions, attacks, "executions," and murders of peasants by the FARC.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. p 1C. This reproduction was taken from a guerrilla fighter's photo album. Above, first on left, is "Teniente Arboleda" with all of his apparel, accompanied by other insurgents. Below, an unpublished photograph of Pedro Antonio Marulanda Marin, alias "Tirofijo," present commander of the FARC in an encampment in Tolima. (Photo file, EL TIEMPO).

The Victims—Soldiers and Peasants

Bogota EL TIEMPO in Spanish 26 May 79 p 5-B

[Text] As a consequence, the FARC have "established" the death penalty in the rural area.

In recent years there has been a systematic return to "capital punishment" for peasants, on whose bodies there are always pasquinades which say that the victims were "executed" because of "betrayal of the guerrilla" and because they collaborated with the military forces.

In recent years the death penalty has been applied to hundreds of victims. The inhabitants of encampments are subjected to a dreadful alternative: collaboration with the guerrilla or expectation of violent death at their hands.

Even though there are no precise statistics for this type of FARC activity for previous years, the statistics reported for 1979 are enough to give one an idea of the regime of terror established by the FARC.

In less than six months, 52 peasants were shot to death.

Paradoxically, in spite of their bloody procedures, the FARC apply a hypocritical system of ethics by means of which the "health committees" of the mountain exert repression.

An example of the strange application of "guerrilla ethics" occurred at the beginning of this year. One day six youths assaulted a student complex under the jurisdiction of Cimitarra, in the midst of shouts and acclamations of the FARC. They took from the student complex two women teachers whom they brought to a woods, where they abused them.

Days later, a FARC command, consisting of men with uniforms and equipment for the exclusive use of the military forces, appeared at the house of the six boys--four of them brothers--and, after a summary trial of a few minutes, sentenced them to death and shot them in the presence of their family. In this manner they protected the name of the FARC and eliminated damage to the "image" of the guerrilla group.

A Balance Sheet

To give an idea of the great size that the FARC have attained in Colombia, we present for the appraisal of the readers brief statistics on the known actions of the past ten years:

1967: Ambushes against the army, 4; encounter with the police, 1; encounters with the army, 2; military forces: casualties, 32; wounded, 14; FARC casualties: 7 dead.

1968: Ambushes, 6; encounters with the army, 6; encounters with the police, 2; abductions, 10 (3 of them in Florencia, Caqueta: Miguel Cabrera, Guillermo and Tomas Perdomo). One of those abducted, Neftali Londono, was killed in Balsillas (Huila). Casualties of the military forces, 13 dead; 3 wounded; FARC casualties: 5 dead, 4 wounded. The most considerable of the FARC attacks during this year was the attack on the police post of Puerto Rico (Caqueta), in which about 200 fully armed guerrilla fighters took part.

1969: Ambushes against the army, 1; encounters with the army, 1; military forces casualties: 2 dead and 5 wounded. Abductions: 8, 5 of them in a single attack on the town of Baraya (Huila) on 20 August. Those abducted were Guillermo Munoz, Ester Gomez, Esteban Munoz, Gerardo and Fanny Munoz. In Antioquia the abducted Ruben Norena was killed and in Popayan, Andres Munoz, both killed after their families had paid the demanded ransom.

1970: Ambushes against the army, 1; attack against a police post, 1; attack against a bus, 1; encounter with the army, 1; casualties of the military forces: 8 dead and 6 wounded; FARC casualties: 2 dead. Abductions: 6; all paid ransoms and were freed.

1971: Encounters with the army, 3; ambushes of the army, 2; ambushes of the police, 1; attack on military bases, 2; attacks on police posts, 2; military helicopters shot down, 1; encounters with the army, 3; abductions, 17, among them those of Alfonso Tobon and Miguel Rengifo, in Quindio, Honorio Leon, in Puerto Boyaca. Casualties of the military forces: 20 dead, 10 wounded. FARC casualties: 8 dead.

1972: Ambushes of the army, 2; encounters with the army, 2; encounters with the police, 1; attack on an army vehicle, 1; attacks against military bases, 1, in Miro Lindo, municipality of El Tambo, Cauca department. Abductions: 7. Casualties of the army: 7 dead, 11 wounded; FARC casualties, 4. (This year the FARC began to operate in the Cauca department.)

1973: Attacks against police posts, 2; encounters with the army, 3; ambushes of the army, 1; attacks against towns, 2; military helicopters shot down, 1; ambush of police vehicles, 1; abductions, 7 (one of the victims, Juan Pena, killed in San Juan de Arama); casualties of the military forces, 19 dead, 6 wounded; FARC casualties: 3 dead (the attack on the police post in San Pedro of Uraba resulted in the death of 5 police officers). The attack on Florián (Jesus Maria, Santander), resulted in 3 policemen being wounded and the theft of a great quantity of equipment. The military helicopter was shot down in San Vicente de Caguán (Caquetá). This same year, 100 guerrilla fighters captured the people of Colombia (Huila), looted the town, and set free 11 prisoners from the Municipal jail. Eight soldiers were killed by the command led by Asnoraldo Betancur ("Balín") in an ambush at Bejucalés, municipality of Arboledas, North Santander. Another ambush at Santa Rita (Cimitarra) took as its toll the death of 4 peasants. Lastly, in Cañon de Amanícu, Rioblanco (Tolima), the army was ambushed, resulting in a total c. six dead. The FARC lost 3 men.

1974: Attacks on police posts, 2; ambushes against the army, 1; encounters with the army, 3; military helicopters damaged, 1; casualties of the military forces: 11 dead, 6 wounded; FARC casualties: 7 dead, 2 wounded; abductions: 6, among them the brothers, Alfonso and Mauricio Dagua, both murdered.

1975: Attacks on police posts, 1; capture of towns, 2; encounters with the army, 2; casualties of the military forces, 8 dead, 4 wounded; FARC casualties: 7 captured in Guadualito; abductions: 6, among them, the former consul of Holland in Cali, Eric Leupin, on 1 February, and set free years later. Three of the other abductions were perpetrated in Cimitarra.

1976: Encounters with the army, 6; ambushes of the police, 2; ambushes against the army, 1; casualties of the military forces, 7 dead and 8 wounded; FARC casualties: 5 dead, 1 captured; abductions: 7, among them that of Freddy Archibald, in San Juan de Arama. One of the persons abducted, Octavio Echeverry, was murdered in the Cimitarra area.

1977: Attacks against police posts, 3; encounters with the army, 6; ambushes against the army, 2 (almost all the above by the Fourth Front of the FARC, in La Palma, Otanche, and Yacopi); abductions: 13, among them, 4 in Algeciras (Huila): Francisco Macias Vargas, Ricardo Bolivar, Manuel Garrido, and Cristina de Espinosa; in Toribio (Cauca), Pedro Miguel Taquinas, Enrique Montano, and Antonio Mesa. On 14 February of this year, in the mountainous district of La Macarena (Meta), the North American scientist, Richard Starr was abducted and is still a prisoner of the FARC. The attack was led by commander of the Seventh Front Marcelino Trujillo, "Capitan Trujillo." In the Esquinas (Caqueta) the brothers, Fabio, Uriel, and Anibal Higinio Gallego were abducted. Two abducted persons were killed: Marcos Cardozo, in Las Perlas (Huila), and Uriel Hurtado, in Puerto Berrio.

1978: Attacks against towns: 6; ambushes against patrols: 5; attempts at capture of barracks: 1; sabotage (pipeline): 1; thefts amounting to \$2,300,000; abductions: 14, six of them in Cimitarra. In La Victoria (Caldas), as a result of resisting abduction, the liberal leaders, Fernando and German Mejia Duque--the latter former governor of Caldas--were murdered. This year a total of 77 peasants, accused of "betrayal of the guerrilla, were murdered, 18 of them in a single action, in the Cimitarra area, by a new brigade of the FARC known as "Las Radiales." Military casualties: 12 dead. The number of FARC casualties for this year is not known.

1979: Reports of this year's actions of the FARC to say the least are disquieting. Less than 20 kilometers from La Dorada, a command of the Fourth Front, led by Ricardo Franco (Teniente Franco), abducted 6 persons, 3 of whom succeeded in escaping. The following are still prisoners of the guerrilla: citizens Marcelo Uribe Urdaneta, nephew of former president Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaez and brother of archbishop of Cali Monsignor Alberto Uribe Urdaneta; Luis Eduardo Gonzalez, and Gabriel Gomez Arrubia. Other actions: attacks against towns, 5; ambushes against the police, 4; murders of peasants, 46; attacks against police posts, 3; casualties of the military forces: 18 dead, 16 wounded; FARC casualties: 13 dead, 3 wounded. The most considerable of the actions: 100 guerrilla fighters attacked San Antonio de Jetuche (Caqueta), where they killed Claudio Garcia. On 18 January, in Yacopi, they carried out an ambush against the army and killed 7 persons (some of them burned alive) and wounded 3. On 30 January, the people in the town of Chaco Curvarado (Caqueta) were attacked: two civilians died; one was wounded. On 4 February, there was an attack against the town of Acevedo (Huila), in which 3 policemen and a priest died. On 6 February: an attack against Cartagena de Chira (Caqueta), resulted in 2 peasants dead and 2 wounded. On 9 February: there was an attack on the route to San Vicente de Chucuri: 4 peasants murdered. On 4 March: 2 army subofficers were murdered in Pensilvania (Huila). On 12 March: in El Tambo (Cauca) 4 peasants were murdered. On 17 April 2 police officers were killed in Umbo (Boyaca). On 21 April, in Cimitarra, 7 peasants were shot. In Yacopi, on 23 April, a military patrol was taken by surprise and 1 soldier died. On 19 May, in Cimitarra, a police inspector was killed.

Military Offensive

Within this gloomy framework, the military forces have recently struck well-aimed blows at the FARC. In Cimitarra 9 insurrectionists were captured. In Sumapaz, an army patrol captured a FARC post office sub-station and confiscated important documentation, according to which preparations were being made to organize another 2 fronts of the organization; and there was a plan to buy equipment for 60 million pesos, the product of recent abductions.

In the meantime, in Bogota, through Army Intelligence, the guerrilla leader, Jose de Jesus Rojas Rivas ("Cartagena") was captured; he furnished important information that is being evaluated by the military forces. The information from "Cartagena" facilitated the death of the guerrilla fighter and chief of the FARC, Alfredo Gomez Duque, alias "Aldemar," commander of one of the mobile patrols.



The map shows the location of the eight FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) fronts. The guerilla group has spread throughout most of the country during the past 5 years and has ousted other subversive movements.

COLOMBIA

COURT ESTABLISHED TO ENFORCE CARTAGENA ACCORDS

Bogota EL ESPPECTADOR in Spanish 29 May 79 p 11-A

[Article by Antonio J. Olier: "Cartagena Pact Court of Justice Established"]

[1] Cartagena, 28 May--The presidents at the Andean summit meeting --Luis Padilla from Bolivia, Julio Cesar Turbay from Colombia, Alfredo Poveda from Ecuador, Francisco Morales Bermudez from Peru and Luis Herrera Campins from Venezuela--signed an agreement to establish the Cartagena Pact Court of Justice. It will guarantee fulfillment of the commitments of the subregional pact "so that integration will attain the effects that the peoples of the member countries expect."

The decisions of the court will not be subject to debate, arbitration or any procedure other than those included in the treaty that establishes that court.

Also the treaty will be in effect with the Cartagena Pact and is not separable from this.

The text of the mentioned document is as follows.

The governments of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, convinced that Latin American economic integration--particularly integration under the Cartagena Pact--is a common objective of economic and social development, and keeping in mind the declaration of the presidents of the Andean countries formulated in Bogota on 8 August 1978;

Aware that it is indispensable to guarantee strict fulfillment of the commitments derived directly and indirectly from the Cartagena Pact so that integration will attain the effects that the peoples of the member countries expect;

Convinced that some of the difficulties in the execution of the Cartagena Pact and the acts that develop from it are caused partly by the complexity of its legal structure;

Certain that the stability of the Cartagena Pact and the rights and obligations that are derived from it must be safeguarded by a top-level juridical organ, independent of the governments of the member countries and the other organs of the Cartagena Pact, with the ability to declare community law, settle conflicts that arise from the law and interpret it uniformly;

Agree, through their duly authorized plenipotentiary representatives, to respect the following treaty that establishes the Cartagena Pact Court of Justice:

Chapter I. On the legal structure of the Cartagena Pact

Article 1. The legal structure of the Cartagena Pact includes:

- a) The Cartagena Pact, its protocols and additional instruments;
- b) The present treaty;
- c) The decisions of the commission; and
- d) The resolutions of the council.

Article 2. The decisions are binding for the member countries from the date on which they are approved by the commission.

Article 3. The decisions of the commission will be directly applicable to the member countries from the date of their publication in the GACETA OFICIAL DEL ACUERDO unless the decisions indicate a later date.

When their text states it, the decisions will require incorporation in national laws through express acts in which the date of entrance into effect in each member country will be indicated.

Article 4. The resolutions of the council will enter into effect on the date and in the way that the regulations establish.

Article 5. The member countries are obliged to adopt the measures necessary to insure compliance with the laws of the Cartagena Pact. They are also obliged not to adopt or use any measure that is contrary to those laws or that in some way impedes their application.

Chapter II. On the establishment and organization of the court

Article 6. The Cartagena Pact Court of Justice is established as principal organ of the same with the organization and jurisdiction established in the present treaty.

The court will be based in Quito, Ecuador.

Article 7. The court will consist of five judges who must be natives of the member countries, have high moral character and meet the conditions required in their countries for the exercise of the highest judicial duties or be jurists of known ability.

The judges will have complete independence in the exercise of their duties. They cannot carry out other professional activities, whether reimbursed or not, except those of an educational nature and they must abstain from any action incompatible with the nature of their position.

At the unanimous request of the court, the Cartagena Pact Commission can change the number of judges and create the position of general counsel with the prerogatives established in the statute to which Article 14 refers.

Article 8. The judges will be appointed unanimously by the accredited plenipotentiaries from slates of three candidates presented by each member country. The government of the host country will convoke the plenipotentiaries.

Article 9. The judges will be appointed for a period of 6 years, some will be replaced every 3 years and they can only be reelected once.

Article 10. Each judge will have a first and second substitute who will replace him, in order, in case of permanent or temporary absence as well as impediment or challenge, in conformity with the statute of the court.

The substitutes must have the same qualifications as the judges. They will be appointed on the same date and for the same period of time.

Article 11. The judges can be removed at the request of the government of a member country only when, in the exercise of their duties, they have incurred in a serious and deliberate offense against the court statute and in conformity with the procedure established. The governments of the member countries will appoint plenipotentiaries who, convoked by the government of the host country, will unanimously resolve the case in a special meeting.

Article 12. At the end of his term, a judge will continue in the exercise of his position until the date on which his replacement takes office.

Article 13. The member countries are obliged to grant the court all the facilities necessary for the proper fulfillment of its functions. The court and its judges will enjoy the immunities recognized by international convention, particularly the Vienna Convention, on diplomatic relations within the territory of the member countries such as the inviolability of their files and their official correspondence and everything referring to civil and criminal jurisdiction with the exceptions included in the Vienna Convention.

The judges, the secretary of the court and the international officials appointed will enjoy the immunities and privileges corresponding to their rank in the territory of the host country. The judges will have rank equivalent to that of chiefs of mission; the other officials will have the ranks established by common agreement between the court and the government of the country.

(Article 12 above remains as 13.) Article 14. The commission, at the proposal of the council and within 3 months after the present treaty goes into effect, will approve the statute that will regulate the officials of the court as well as the legal procedures to which the exercise of the activities included in this treaty will be subject.

Amendments to this statute will be adopted by the commission at the request of the court.

Decisions of the commission in this area will be passed with a two-thirds vote as long as there are no negative votes cast.

The court will dictate its own internal regulations.

Article 15. The court will appoint a secretary and the personnel needed for the fulfillment of its duties.

Article 16. The commission will approve the court budget annually. The president of the court will propose the corresponding budget bill on the appropriate date each year.

Chapter III. On the jurisdiction of the court. First section: on the action of annulment.

Article 17. The court can annul the decisions of the commission and the resolutions dictated by the council if they violate the laws of the Cartagena Pact, even by deviation of power, when they are opposed

by a member country, the commission, the council or natural or legal persons under the conditions included in Article 19 of this treaty.

Article 18. The member countries can only attempt the action of annulment in relation to those decisions that were not passed with their affirmative votes.

Article 19. Natural or legal persons can attempt the action of annulment against the decisions of the commission or the resolutions of the council that are applicable to them and hurt them.

Article 20. The action of annulment must be brought before the court within a year following the date of the entrance into effect of the decision of the commission or the council resolution.

Article 21. Initiation of the action of annulment will not affect the effectiveness or existence of the law opposed.

Article 22. When the court declares total or partial annulment of the decision or resolution opposed, it will indicate the effects of this decision.

The Cartagena Pact organ whose action has been annulled must adopt the necessary provisions to insure effective compliance with the decision.

Second section: on noncompliance

Article 23. When the council feels that a member country has not complied with obligations of the laws of the Cartagena Pact, it will put its observations in writing. The member country will have to answer within a term compatible with the urgency of the case, not exceeding 2 months. After the response is received or the term has expired, the council can request a court decision.

Article 24. When a member country feels that another member country has not complied with obligations of the laws of the Cartagena Pact, it can take its case to the council, giving the background of the case, so that this will issue an opinion after the procedure indicated in the first clause of Article 23.

If the decision is noncompliance and the member country persists in this conduct, the council must request a court decision. If the council does not initiate the action within 2 months following the date of its decision, the complaining country can appeal directly to the court.

If the council does not issue its decision within 3 months after the date of presentation of the complaint or the decision was not non-compliance, the complaining country can appeal directly to the court.

Article 25. If the decision of the court was noncompliance, the member country whose conduct has been the subject of the complaint will be obliged to adopt the necessary measures for the execution of the decision within 3 months of notification.

If the member country does not fulfill the obligation indicated in the preceding paragraph, the court summarily and after the decision of the council, will determine the limits within which the complaining country and any other member country can restrict or suspend, totally or partially, the advantages of the Cartagena Pact that benefit the remiss member country. The court, through the council, will communicate its decision to the member countries.

Article 26. The sentences dictated in actions of noncompliance are reviewable by the same court at the request of the member country based on some fact that influenced decisively in the result of the process whenever that fact was unknown at the time of the decision to the party that requests the review.

The request for review must be presented within 2 months following the date on which the fact is discovered and, in any case, within a year following the date of the decision.

Article 27. Natural or legal persons have the right to appeal to the appropriate national courts in conformity with national laws when the member countries do not comply with that provided in Article 5 of the present treaty if their laws are affected by that noncompliance.

Third section: on legal interpretation

Article 28. The court will interpret the laws of the Cartagena Pact in order to insure their uniform application in the territory of the member countries.

Article 29. National judges who hear a case in which one of the laws of the Cartagena Pact is applicable can request court interpretation of those laws whenever the decision is susceptible to appeal under national law. If the time to issue a decision arrives before the court interpretation has been received, the judge will have to decide the case.

If the decision was not susceptible to appeal under national law, the judge will suspend the proceedings and request court interpretation officially in every case or at the request of one party if he considers it appropriate.

Article 30. In its interpretation, the court will limit itself to stating the content and scope of the laws of the Cartagena Pact. The court cannot interpret the content and scope of national laws nor rule on the material facts of the case.

Article 31. The judge who hears the case must adopt the court interpretation.

Chapter IV. General provisions

Article 32. The decisions of the court will not require ratification by any of the member countries.

Article 33. The member countries will not submit any conflict that arises from the application of the laws of the Cartagena Pact to any court, arbitration or any procedure other than those included in the present treaty.

The member countries agree to use the procedure established in Article 23 of the Cartagena Pact only in conflicts that arise between some of them and a signatory party of the Montevideo Treaty that is not a member of the Cartagena Pact.

Article 34. The council will publish the GACETA OFICIAL DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA containing the decisions of the commission, the council resolutions and the court decisions.

Article 35. When it feels it is necessary for the fulfillment of its duties, the court can go directly to the authorities of the member countries.

Chapter V. Adherence, effect and rejection

Article 36. The present treaty cannot be signed with reservations. The states that adhere to the Cartagena Pact must adhere to the present treaty.

Article 37. This treaty will enter into effect when all the member countries that sign it have given the respective instruments of ratification to the Secretariat of the Cartagena Pact Commission.

Article 38. The present treaty will remain in effect for the same period as the Cartagena Pact and is not separable from this. Rejection of the Cartagena Pact will mean rejection of the present treaty.

This treaty as well as the Cartagena Pact will be in effect independent of the Montevideo Treaty.

Chapter VI. Temporary provisions

First. The action of annulment that the first section of Chapter III of the present treaty discusses can be initiated against the decisions of the commission and the council resolutions that have been approved before the date on which the present instrument enters into effect within a year following the date of effect.

Second. The government of the host country of the court must convoke the plenipotentiaries mentioned in Article 8 for the first appointment of judges within 3 months after the date the present treaty goes into effect.

Third. In the first appointment, two of the judges will be named for 3 years and three for 6 years through a lottery immediately after their appointment.

In witness whereof, the accredited plenipotentiaries, having used their full powers in good and proper form, sign the present treaty in the name of their respective governments.

Signed in the city of Cartagena on 28 May 1979.

7717
CSO: 3010

COLOMBIA

ANTI-INFLATION STRATEGY ANNOUNCED

Bogota EL SIGLO in Spanish 7 Jun 79 pp 1, 12

[Article by Silverio Gomez and Rafael Bermudez Cruz: "New Anti-inflation Strategy"]

[Text] The government adopted a new anti-inflation strategy last night based on a gradual and selective increase of imports and accelerated payments abroad for those imports.

After an 8-hour meeting of the Monetary Council, the economic team and the rest of the cabinet went to San Carlos Palace where recommendations were given by the National Planning Department. The government concluded that the most prudent road is to advance by stages with a policy of liberated imports that simultaneously protects industry and gives it the opportunity to become as efficient as other countries' industries.

As is known, the country is facing the prospect of another period of rising international coffee prices due to the severe frosts that have affected an important number of coffee growers in Brazil. Colombian coffee rose about 30 cents per pound in the last 5 days.

This situation and the system of monetary exchange control existing in Colombia would bring in a great amount of currency if coffee prices continue to rise. This would increase the amount of money in circulation, opening the "door" to an inflationary period like the one after 1975 caused by the same coffee phenomenon.

The economic team and President Turbay began to study three possible alternatives. The first is not to do anything concerning imports or payments, leaving the anti-inflation fight only to the monetary and fiscal front.

If adopted, that possibility would paralyze public investments which support a major part of the National Integration Plan to which the

government has committed itself for the next 4 years. It would also cause an acute crisis in the financial sector. This sector has demanded that the government give more flexibility to the instruments of monetary contraction imposed since 1976 to confront the "inflation race." Today there is an ordinary interest of 45 percent and a marginal one of 100 percent.

The second alternative studied was to continue the present import policy but to establish measures to accelerate payments abroad. Although it is a better option than the first, it causes contraction in public investments and stricter credit control in a sector where the monetary instruments have already been exhausted as in the first case. The limit on credit would also have negative effects on industry; it would have to contract more to avoid increased retail prices.

The Strategy

The third alternative was the one adopted last night by the national government in a joint meeting of the cabinet and the National Council for Economic and Social Policy. It establishes a combined strategy on two fronts: gradual and selective increase of imports and accelerated payments abroad.

This measure, according to the government, has the double advantage that it helps mitigate the inflationary problem for the coming months while it responds to long-term criteria like industrial strengthening, greater efficiency and protection for the national consumer.

Increased imports will be made through a gradual and selective process and through tariffs, the system of prior licenses and free imports. The Foreign Trade Council will determine that gradual and selective process.

Accelerated payments abroad through imports which will accompany the liberated imports will be regulated soon by the Monetary Council. It has already begun to study some mechanisms including a special system of domestic interest rates so that it will not be better to keep money in the country rather than make payments abroad. At present, domestic interest is approximately 28 percent compared to 22 percent abroad.

The Customs Policy Council will define a new tariff policy to facilitate imports that the country needs since the problem is based on the fact that the combination of a low tariff for intermediate products and a high tariff on finished merchandise, in addition to the system of prior licenses that exists today, results in excessively high protection for the national industry.

The principal argument of the strategy adopted last night is based on the fact that an examination of the experience of recent years in handling increased international reserves reveals that increased imports are not enough to counterbalance the increased currency from those additional exports. According to the government, it is necessary to accelerate payments abroad.

Thus far this year, imports have increased 40 percent while payments abroad have increased only 8 percent.

The government decision to liberate imports and accelerate payments abroad will necessitate, at least for the short term, an in-depth revision of the Monetary Exchange Statute. This possibility had been opened to avoid expansion of the means of payment through the additional revenue and to give the Bank of the Republic the monopoly over supply and demand of foreign currency.

7717
CSO: 3010

AMERICANS RECEIVED BY 'GRANMA', CULTURAL AGENCIES

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 13 Jun 79 p 3

[Text] U.S. Newsmen Visit GRANMA

Robert Chrisman and Bob Allen, publisher and editor of the United States periodical BLACK SCHOLAR, respectively, visited GRANMA's editorial offices yesterday. They were received there by Elio E. Constantin, assistant editor of this daily. Margarita Delgado, an official in the America Department of the Central Committee, also participated in the talk.

Social Legislation Slump Affects Blacks

Robert Chrisman and Robert Allen, publisher and editor, respectively, of the United States periodical BLACK SCHOLAR, gave a lecture, yesterday, on the black movement in the United States to specialists and students of the subject from various mass and state organizations, in the Plaza House of Culture.

Allen said that, under the guise of a tax reduction program, legislation on social welfare, education, health and the government employment sector is being attacked. This is affecting the American black.

He pointed out that the lowest level of industrial employment has been reached and the blacks are the first to be laid off when bad times come.

Among the mechanisms created for preventing the training of blacks are scholastic achievement tests that make it hard for blacks to obtain a diploma and are forcing them to resort to more menial jobs.

He said that this is part of a campaign to try to show that blacks in the United States have been given opportunities, but that their lack of individual education is what prevents them from obtaining better jobs.

Another means of aggression is the legal trial brought against Kayser because of the contract by which this company was to use in its training

programs there a sufficient number of blacks to raise their proportion in the company to the same level as the proportion of blacks in the population of Louisiana -- 40 percent -- where the company is located.

Guillen Receives U.S. Newsmen

Nicolas Guillen, member of the Central Committee of our party and president of UNEAC [National Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba, received Robert Chrisman and Bob Allen, newsmen from the United States, in the headquarters of that organization. Guillen talked extensively with the American guests.

10,042

CSO: 3010

HAVANA BALLET TOUR IN U.S. RUNS THROUGH JULY

Havana JUVENTUD REBELDE in Spanish 16 May 79 p 1

[Article by Martha Gonzalez]

(Text) The Cuban National Ballet will go to the United States on 19 May to make a tour of that country lasting until 28 July of this year. The ballet company's first performance is announced for 21 May in the city of San Francisco.

The foregoing was announced by Alicia Alonso, director of the BNC (Cuban National Ballet), in a press conference held in the group's headquarters.

Twenty-four ballets will be offered to the public in the United States in these performances. Seventeen will be seen there for the first time. Some titles are: "Giselle," "Rara Avis" [Rare Bird], "Espirito" [Spartacus], "Pulsaciones" [Pulsations], "La Peri" [The Fairy], "Bodas de Sangre" [Blood Wedding], "El Lago de los Cisnes" [Swan Lake], "Canto Vital" [Vital Song], "Remembranza" [Remembrance] and "Danza con la Guitarra" [Dance with the Guitar]. This last ballet, whose fundamental idea is based on how the use of the guitar began and the various characteristics that it has had until its present state of development, will be accompanied by guitarists Jesus Ortega, Carlos Molina, Rey Guerra and Flores Chaviano. Alberto Mendez is responsible for its production and choreography.

Part of the company staying in Cuba will keep up the line of constant work in the Cuban ballet school. Work is being done for that purpose on the ballet "Blanca Nieves y los 7 Enanitos" [Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs], with choreography by Gladys Gonzalez, and with which they propose to celebrate the International Children's Year. Its premiere will be on 10 June in the Ciudad Deportiva [Sports Compound]. Several premieres are also scheduled during the celebration of Carifesta '79, including "La Muerte de Narciso" [Death of Narcissus], by Ivan Tenorio, and "El Barco" [The Ship], by Gustavo Herrera.

After the company returns from the United States it will undertake a tour in Europe, including performances in the Edinburgh Festival in Great

Britain, in Italy, France, the FRG, the GDR, Switzerland and Spain. It is possible that Alicia will dance ad lib with Antonio Cades in the last performance in Madrid.

Within this broad BNC programing, Alicia Alonso, Loipa Araujo, Jorge Esquivel and Carlos Zamorano have been invited to participate in the World Ballet Festival in Tokyo, to be held in August. Likewise, Alicia will dance in the activities scheduled for the sixth summit meeting of nonaligned countries.

10,042
CSO: 3010

HAVANA PURSUES PUERTO RICO THEME IN PRESS

PSP Lecture on Struggle

Havana JUVENTUD REBELDE in Spanish 16 May 79 p 4

[Text] Felipe Cirino Colon, representative of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party in Cuba, gave a lecture on his country's struggle for independence, in the Carlos Balino tobacco factory.

The speaker expressed gratitude for the opportunity to speak before a sector of our working class, which is one of the most progressive, and also in a center bearing the name of a precursor of socialism in our country.

He also mentioned the solidarity emanating from the Latin American country that freed itself from exploitation of man by man and chose its own destiny.

This activity took place in the framework of the work in preparation for the Second International Conference on Solidarity with Puerto Rico's Independence to be held in Mexico City this coming September.

Federico de Cordoba, member of the secretariat of the Movement for Peace and Sovereignty of Peoples, and leaders of the political and mass organizations in the factory were on the speaker's platform.

Support for Independence Movement

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 28 May 79 p 6

[Article by Oscar Ferrer: "A Mandate of Our Times -- Support Puerto Rico"]

[Text] The just cause of the people of Puerto Rico, colonized by the United States since 1898, over 80 years ago now, has the sympathy and solidarity of the international community and enjoys recognized prestige, as is demonstrated by the fact that in September last year the United Nations Decolonization Committee approved a resolution in favor of the island's right to self-determination and independence, specifying that only the Puerto Ricans can decide on the status that they want for their country.

The attempts by American imperialism to perpetuate its domination over Puerto Rico, aggravated at present by maneuvers of out-and-out annexationist nature being pursued by the colonial administration headed by Governor Carlos Romero Barcelo and shared with pleasure by the United States authorities, are a definite challenge to the will of the Puerto Ricans, to the resolution of the Decolonization Committee and to the international support that the Puerto Ricans' aspiration to freedom has.

This unequal struggle between colonizer and colonized that can be summarized as a confrontation between what is unjust and what is just, places before public opinion the unavoidable duty of strengthening support and solidarity with the fatherland of Betances and Albizu Campos.

The First International Conference on Solidarity with Puerto Rico's Independence, held in Havana in September 1975, was a move forward in worldwide support of the Puerto Rican people. The second conference, called by the World Peace Council, will be held in the latter part of this year in Mexico.

National committees have already been set up in several countries and the international meeting in preparation for this second conference will be held in Havana on 30 and 31 May.

The preparatory meeting and the second conference take on special importance, because they will be held at a time when the annexationist designs of Romero Barcelo are becoming most dangerous. In complicity with the United States authorities, he plans to hold a plebiscite, in 1981, devised to try to give an appearance of popular approval of the treacherous plot attempting to make Puerto Rico the 51st state of the Union.

Together with this annexationist madness, the island's internal situation is deteriorating. Puerto Rican workers are the worst paid and have the lowest buying power under the United States administration.

The economic situation of the Puerto Rican people is so unsteady that, at present, close to 70 percent are obliged to resort to the so-called "Food Stamps," to which access was limited severely, last March, by an act of the American Congress, owing to the high number of requests, understandable if it is realized that there is a 40-percent unemployment rate on the island.

In Puerto Rico, from where American corporations carried off \$2.3 billion to the United States in 1977, there also is a climate of repression that found its most brutal expression with the assassination of two young independent movement members, perpetrated in Cerro Maravilla, with the knowledge and consent of the colonial governor, in July last year.

Repression is applied against those who reject with determination American military presence on the island and the war exercises carried out by the United States Navy in Puerto Rican waters and, in particular, on the island of Vieques, turned into a firing range.

Along with this, the inhuman stubbornness of the United States Government and the island's colonial authorities in refusing to release Puerto Rican political prisoners unconditionally still continues. These prisoners include some of the ones held longest on the continent and perhaps in the world, like Lolita Lebron, Oscar Collazo, Irving Flores and Rafael Cancel Miranda.

In a world that is shaking off the last colonial vestiges, maintenance of United States domination over Puerto Rico is a stain on the conscience of freedom-loving men.

Puerto Rico deserves to control its own destiny, because it has won that right, because no people deserve for themselves the status of a colony.

Vieques, Navy Target Range

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 29 May 79 p 6

[Article by Oscar Ferrer]

[Text] The repeated use of the islands and waters around Puerto Rico by the United States Navy as firing practice areas, including that country's traditional fishing areas, has given rise to an increasing feeling of irritation among the Puerto Ricans.

In the last few months, on the municipal island of Vieques, east of Puerto Rico, the residents, especially the fishermen, have given a number of demonstrations of courage in challenging the threatening presence of American warships.

On 21 May this year, once more, the brutality of the United States Marine Corps troops fell on the fishermen who were preparing to go out to work in the island's waters, when a naval exercise was in progress.

The Vieques fishermen went out in their fragile boats to challenge the intruding ships and interrupted the progress of naval maneuvers, like Springboard, in February 1978, and Radex 79, last January.

In addition to threatening the lives of the island's inhabitants, the maneuvers in Vieques waters cause the destruction or alteration of the sea resources of the place, when the projectiles cause the death of fish and crustaceans with the seismic waves to which they give rise.

Vieques and other Puerto Rican islands have undergone and are undergoing the consequences of the devastation caused by United States naval maneuvers, especially after intensification of the use of those territories as firing ranges, when the American Congress decided to discontinue war exercises off the Florida coast, when United States fishermen protested.

In addition to the fishermen's conflict, the residents of Vieques and of the adjacent areas and sectors are in imminent danger of dying in a huge explosion that might take place at any time in the very large bomb and projectile depots that the United States Navy has on the place.

The United States Navy maintains 97 active ammunition depots full of explosive material on Vieques, where the United States has been occupying 26 of the island's 33-square-mile area, since 1941.

There are bombs weighing up to 2,000 pounds in those ammunition depots, and, many times, it has been reported that the United States military personnel responsible for handling the contents of these explosive depots frequently work under the influence of alcoholic beverages.

This fact is confirmed by the existence of a memorandum, dated 17 November 1978, in which the United States Navy admits this practice and warns of the danger that it represents.

Another proof of the threat implied to the safety and lives of the residents of Vieques by American military presence on the island is the fact that bombs with a high destructive capability, used in the naval maneuvers on Vieques, are transported through the streets of the town in trucks without any identification or warning, in order to try to conceal from the indignant residents of the place the danger surrounding them.

Recently, last January, a United States court in Puerto Rico denied the Vieques Fishermen's Association the right of its members to fish in waters "restricted by the Navy" and it maintained that the United States Navy can continue its destructive practices on the island.

The fishermen, who have even been threatened with confiscation and destruction of their fishing gear, have continued, with a high spirit of struggle, their work in the waters of their island and they invade the scene of the naval exercises, in order to interrupt them at the risk of their own lives.

The combative position of the people of Vieques can be summarized in the words of Carlos Zenon, leader of the fishermen and of the Crusade for the Rescue of Vieques, who has pointed out that the island's residents will not give up exercising the right to earn their living in their country's waters.

U.S. 'Political' Prisoner Flores

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 30 May 79 p 6

[Article by Hector Melendez: "Funds Collected in Puerto Rico to Provide Medical Care for Patriot Irving Flores, in Prison in the United States"]

(Text) San Juan, 29 May (PL)--A campaign to collect funds that will make a medical examination of patriot Irving Flores, in prison in the United States since 1954, possible was started here.

Flores suffers from an abscess on the throat that affects his speech, according to what is reported by members of his family who said that the United States penitentiary authorities refuse to turn over the medical record, and the diagnosis of the case is unknown.

The collection campaign started as soon as the illness of Flores became known publicly. Yesterday, a special committee was set up in Cabo Rojo, the imprisoned independence movement member's birthplace, with the support of the mayor of that region.

Flores' illness and the refusal by the penal authorities to issue a report on the medical diagnosis, bring to light the repeated accusations by various sectors on the deficient medical care received by the four Puerto Rican political prisoners in United States prisons.

Andres Figueroa Cordero, another of those political prisoners (the longest in prison on the continent) died last March in Puerto Rico.

He was released from prison only when United States physicians diagnosed his early death from cancer.

Irving Flores, Andres Figueroa, Lolita Lebron and Rafael Cancel Miranda were members of a nationalist commando unit that burst into a session of the United States Congress, on 1 March 1954, to draw international attention to Puerto Rico's colonial status.

A fifth nationalist prisoner is Oscar Collazo, in prison since 1950, when he participated in an assassination attack on the president of the United States at that time, Harry S Truman, also demanding freedom for Puerto Rico.

The four independence movement members still alive have rejected clemency petitions and they reaffirm the validity of their acts, while they have repeated that they will never cease fighting for Puerto Rico's independence.

The movement for the release of the four prisoners from prison even extends to municipal governments, political parties, the press, legislative chambers, churches and other organizations.

Solidarity Meeting in Mexico Set

Havana JUVENTUD REBELDE 17, Spanish, 11 May 79 p. 1

[Article by Elsa Claro: "Second Conference of Solidarity with Puerto Rico Will be in Mexico in November"]

[Text] The Second Conference on solidarity with Puerto Rico will be held in November this year in Mexico, as was announced in the preparatory meeting for that event, being held since yesterday in Havana.

The session was held during the morning, after a symbolic assault by Cuban Pioneers. The Call and the Action Plan for the international conference to be held in the Aztec capital, among other documents, were approved in it.

The plan involves, among its important points, the establishment of an International Preparatory Committee (CIP) that will be set up today, the organization of national support committees and wide publicity on Puerto Rico's colonial status and on the threat to the peace of the world represented by the United States bases on Puerto Rican territory.

The plan also specifies the visit by a delegation of this CIP to the United Nations Decolonization Committee to submit the documents approved in this preparatory meeting, to request issuance of a decolonization program to be supervised by the United Nations and to ask that organization to send representatives to the second conference.

Unconditional release of the political prisoners held by United States authorities for over a quarter of a century and elimination of that country's military bases on the island of Puerto Rico are other demands contained in the Action Plan, which also includes continuation of a request for and promotion of the world's solidarity with this independence cause.

Today's session was presided over, among other prominent persons, by Ly Van Sau, from Vietnam. When this edition was closed, they were proceeding to submit to the judgment of the delegates the CIP that would consist of all the delegations and countries present in the preparatory meeting.

10,042
PSO. 3010

'TUC' PROPOSALS SOURCE OF CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATE

Georgetown GUYANA CHRONICLE in English 23 Jun 79 p 1

[Excerpts]

THE Constituent Assembly began its task of drafting Guyana's new constitution yesterday with a spirited two-hour debate on proposals by the Guyana Trades Union Congress for a sharing of power by political parties represented in Parliament and other national organisations.

An expansion of the present Parliament, election of an Executive President directly by the electorate, and an enlargement of the Elections Commission and other statutory commissions are among the proposals tabled by the TUC in a memorandum which is now the subject of debate.

President Basil Blair, First Vice-President Norman Semple and General Secretary J.H. Polycarpus who appeared as witnesses, to supplement the TUC memorandum with oral evidence invited questions from other members of the

Assembly and members were still discussing the sharing of power in Parliament when the adjournment was taken to next Wednesday.

On the resumption, the TUC team is to reply to questions by Energy and Natural Resources Minister

Hubert Jack, who, while stating that the proposals could go a long way to solving some of the country's problems, questioned certain aspects.

Under the TUC proposals, the trade union umbrella organisation and the Guyana Association of Local Authorities should get twelve seats each in Parliament.

They also proposed that the office of the Leader of the Opposition should be abolished and replaced by Leader of the Minority party or parties. According to Cde Blair who opened the debate

the proposals were a consensus from the TUC executive and a special conference held to discuss the matter.

Cde. Polycarpus explained that the proposal to expand the membership of the Elections Commission was made in view of concern over the conduct of elections and he proposed that if there were also representatives of the TUC and GALA it may go a long way to allay fears.

Cde Semple said the work of the Commissions particularly the Public Service Commission was hampered when some members cannot sit if they are enlarged to 12 members they can sit on committees.

It was however, the new ministerial system and allocation of seats that drew most of the questions from United Force Leader Mardallius Seiden Singh and Ministers and other members of the Government side.

Mr. Singh who regretted that the debate did not start off on the memorandum of the ruling People's National Congress felt the enlarged Parliament would be too cumbersome and expensive.

He also wanted to know how the TUC decided on the 12 seats in Parliament and Cde Polycarpus said they would allocate according to areas of industrial interests like sugar, bauxite, iron, etc.

Former Minister Winslow Carrington asked whether the TUC members of Parliament would have the vote and what would be done to prevent them from leaving the TUC camp once they got into Parliament.

Cde Blair said they would be expected to vote and initiate legislation formally instead of working from behind the scenes as they have been doing in the past.

Cde Polycarpus said he would expect the constitutional experts to make provisions so that TUC members of Parliament cannot cross the floor. Attorney General Cde Mohamed Shahabuddeen was involved in a 30-minute exchange with Cde Semple on the TUC claims to equal treatment as GALA since the Minister felt that by the TUC proposals the workers would have a three-line route to representation.

Minister Shahabuddeen also raised a distinction between technocrat Ministers and representatives of the TUC who did not face the polls but ... Cde Semple said the TUC proposals were justified because of their direct relationship to the workers. Cde Semple argued that system was not new because it obtained in other socialist societies.

Minister Jack who observed that the TUC had made "a serious search for proposals that could result in consensual government" asked for clarification on the committees that the TUC felt would spring out of Parliament.

Cde. Jack asked whether the Ministers from the minority parties would support their Cabinet colleagues or their respective parties and if when they resigned it would mean new elections or they would just return to their back bench.

Minister Jack had no questions on whether it would be obligatory on the minority parties to take up the portfolios but he commended the TUC for "being bold enough to venture into a new path constitutionally as far as Guyana is concerned."

CSO: 3020

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED WITH YUGOSLAVIA

Georgetown GUYANA CHRONICLE in English 17 Jun 79 pp 1, 16, 32

[Text] Guyana and Yugoslavia agreed on concrete steps to strengthen their bilateral relations in the economic, trade and scientific fields during the just concluded visit of Yugoslav Vice-President Petar Stambolic.

But they stressed the importance of securing closer economic co-operation between their countries within the framework of the Action Programme for Economic Co-operation among non-aligned and other developing countries. "In this regard the areas of forestry, mining, agricultural development and trade were identified", they announced in a joint communique issued yesterday. Cde Stambolic, who left yesterday, expressed his gratitude to the Government and people of Guyana for the cordial, fraternal and warm hospitality accorded him and members of his delegation during his stay.

The communique disclosed that during an exchange of views with Prime Minister Burnham, Cde Stambolic covered a wide range of international issues and matters of bilateral cooperation.

The joint Guyana/Yugoslavia communique said:

Cde. Petar Stambolic, a member of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, paid an official visit to the Co-operative Republic of Guyana from June 13 - 16, 1979, in response to an invitation from that Government.

Included in the Party of Cde. Stambolic were Cde. Aleksander Fira, Member of the Federal Executive Council, Cde. Milan Šipan, Ambassador of Yugoslavia to Guyana and Cde. Ignac Golob, Assistant Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

During his visit Cde. Stambolic paid a courtesy call on Cde. Raymond Arthur Chung, President of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana. At impressive ceremonies in Georgetown, Cde. Stambolic also laid floral tributes at the 1763 Monument in D'Urbar Park and the Non-Aligned Monument at Company Path.

The Vice-President accompanied by his party visited Linden where he was accorded a civic welcome, met with workers and toured the Industrial Complex.

Cde Stambolic exchanged views with Cde. L. F. S. Burnham, Prime Minister of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, on a wide range of international issues and matters of bilateral co-operation. Discussions were also held with the General Secretary of the People's National Congress, Cde. P. A. Reid. They informed each other of relevant social and economic developments in the respective countries and expressed their desire to further strengthen the relations between their two political parties.

This visit by the Vice President of Yugoslavia constitutes another significant step in the development of Guyanese-Yugoslav friendship. The warm and cordial welcome given to Cde. Stambolic and his party was evidence of the strong bonds of solidarity between the two countries and peoples.

The two sides reviewed the current international situation and their bilateral relations in an atmosphere of cordiality and mutual understanding. Their discussions were characterised by an identity of view on all issues.

During the analysis of the international situation the two sides reiterated the importance of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the policy of Non-Alignment as an historic and decisive factor, independent of bloc and military alliances in the struggle for peace and democracy in international political and economic relations and in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, racism, apartheid and alien domination.

They agreed that unity and solidarity of Non-Aligned countries are their most efficacious weapon in the struggle for the establishing of new political and economic international relations. They stressed the need to resolutely oppose the external pressures being exerted on the Non-Aligned Movement as well as the threats against their unity and the attempts to question the principles of Non-Alignment.

The recently concluded Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau held in Colombo from June 4-9, 1979 made a significant contribution to the preparations for the Sixth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries which will be held in Havana, Cuba in September of this year. In this context, the two sides noted the significance of the forthcoming Summit, the first to be held in Latin America and stressed the importance of the meeting in strengthening the unity and solidarity of the Non-Aligned countries on the basis of the principles and policy of Non-Alignment.

Indispensable

The two sides emphasised that it is indispensable to intensify the process of detente, and expressed the belief that detente should be universal and should encompass all regions of the world and all areas of co-operation and that all countries should make a contribution to this end if genuine peace and social progress are to be achieved and sustained.

The two sides recalled the attempts by the racist minority regimes in Zimbabwe and Namibia and their allies, to effect internal settlements against the wishes and aspirations of the people. They condemned the so-called independent constitution in Zimbabwe under which elections were recently held as an exercise in mass deception and that the ensuing Government should not be recognized.

They reaffirmed their full support for the Patriotic Front in its struggle for genuine independence and majority rule. They also reiterated their support for the people of Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO in their struggle to also redeem their political heritage. They also reviewed the situation in South Africa and roundly condemned the minority racist regime and its policy of apartheid which is a crime against humanity. They reiterated their full support for the people in their struggle for a just settlement of the problem.

The two sides reiterated their conviction that the issue of the Western Sahara must be settled in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, thus ensuring the inalienable right of the people to self-determination, national independence and territorial integrity free from threats and pressures.

Concern

In relation to the Middle East Situation and Palestinian question, the two sides expressed grave concern over the serious threats to international peace and security which resulted from Israel's continued policy of aggression and expansion and its refusal to implement resolutions of the United Nations. They reiterated their support for the positions which the Non-Aligned Countries had articulated for a just, comprehensive and lasting solution to these problems. The two sides reaffirmed that central to such a solution was the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to an independent state, under (their only legitimate) representatives, the Palestine Liberation Organisation and permanent solution was unattainable without a complete withdrawal by Israel from all Arab territories occupied since 1967.

In reviewing the situation in Latin America and the Caribbean, the two sides highly appreciated the success of the peoples of the region in their struggle for national liberation and in the consolidation of their political and economic independence. They reaffirmed their full support to the efforts of the states in the region in exercising control and sovereignty over their natural resources.

Struggle

The two sides reiterated their full support for the struggle of the people of Belize for national independence, self-determination and territorial integrity.

In the analysis of contemporary international economic relations views were exchanged on the lack of political will by some developed countries to promote the establishment of the New International Economic Order. In this context they noted the fact that many developing countries, especially oil deficient ones, were facing serious economic problems. The two sides reaffirmed their determination multilaterally and bilaterally to work for the acceleration of economic co-operation among non-aligned and other developing countries which is an important element in the programme for the New International Economic Order. In this respect they acknowledged the important work done by Guyana and Yugoslavia in their capacities as co-ordinators in the Action Programme for Economic Co-operation adopted by the Fifth Summit in Colombo in 1976. The two sides welcomed the decision of the Colombo Bureau Meeting for the convening of a group of experts to make recommendations to the Havana Summit on mutual economic assistance among non-aligned countries. The Yugoslav side welcomed this initiative taken by Guyana and agreed on the necessity to ensure the success of these efforts.

They agreed to continue close collaboration in all fora for the early establishment of the New International Economic Order. The two sides agreed on concrete steps to strengthen their bilateral relations in the economic, trade and scientific fields and stressed the importance of securing closer economic co-operation between their countries within the framework of the Action Programme for Economic Co-operation among non-aligned and other developing countries. In this regard the areas of forestry, mining, agricultural development and trade were identified.

Cde. Petar Stambolic, Vice President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, expressed his gratitude to the Government and people of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana for the cordial, fraternal and warm hospitality accorded to him and members of his delegation during their stay in Guyana.

CSO: 3020

POLICE SEEK CLUES TO HOUSE OF ISRAEL BOMBINGS

Georgetown GUYANA CHRONICLE in English 14 Jun 79 pp 8, 9

[Text] POLICE and fire officers hunting for clues in the early morning bomb blasts at the House of Israel yesterday, said they were examining a number of samples and articles taken from the scene which they hoped would help their investigations.

They had also questioned a number of persons including the two casualties of the explosion — seven year old Dexter Haley, one of the 60 occupants of the Alberttown building who was injured on the finger, and Detective Inspector Jagmohan who was

burnt on the left leg and ankle when one of the two hand-made bombs went off.

Police reports stated that the first incendiary bomb exploded at about 5:10 a.m. as members of the sect were gathering for morning worship. About two hours later there was another blast caused by the second device.

Police and Fire Service units rushed to the scene and put out a blaze in the

bottom flat of the building where the bombs went off. They later took away some plastic bags and a bottle which have been sent to the police forensic laboratory for examination.

Leader of the sect, Rabbi Emanuel Washington arrived shortly after receiving a report at his Bel Air Promenade residence. He said he had received a number of telephone warnings during the past year. Last week he and his followers received nine such calls but had ignored them.

'BY-CATCH' FISH PROJECT INSPIRES OTHERS TO SAVE, FEED MORE

Georgetown GUYANA CHRONICLE in English 14 Jun 79 pp 8, 9

[Text] TORONTO (Canal) - Dependence on imported food supplies could be considerably lessened in parts of the Third World if a fishery project now underway in Guyana is adopted in other shrimp producing countries, a biologist with the Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in Ottawa has suggested.

The "By Catch" project, as it is called, aimed at eliminating waste of valuable food resources, was discussed at a recent science symposium in Toronto at which IDRC projects were highlighted.

Dr. W.H. Altsopp, fishery biologist and economist with the IDRC reporting on the success of the "By Catch" project in Guyana, noted that Guyana has stopped importing fish.

He said that the project didn't provide an increase in domestic supplies of high value food in other countries where it can be adopted.

According to Dr. Altsopp, a native of Guyana, "By

Catch" is the term used to refer to what was called "Trash Fish" caught during shrimp trawling.

He said that before the "By Catch" project was started the "trash fish" would be thrown overboard.

Dr. Altsopp, who spoke at the symposium, said later in an interview that a shrimp trawler fishing in Guyana or elsewhere catches about ten pounds of shrimp for every 50 pounds of fish.

"Wherever in the tropics you are catching shrimp and the boats are designed for holding only a small quantity of shrimp for export the so-called trash fish is usually shovelled overboard," he said.

Since 1975 the IDRC has been assisting Guyana in the "By Catch" project by converting what used to be thrown away to food.

Guyanese shrimp trawlers are required to supply a specified quota of fish per month and through IDRC's assistance Guyana has been able to process salted

fish and minced crumbled fish while continuing to export shrimp, Dr. Altsopp said.

Use of the "By Catch" for human consumption rather than for feeding sharks and gulls when shovelled overboard, is the objective of the project, he remarked.

Already the "By Catch" project has attracted considerable attention in countries in Latin America and other parts of the Third World, he reported.

He told CANA that the project has been so stimulating that countries like Mexico, Panama, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela are trying to promote similar ones.

He also said that countries in Africa as well as India and other parts of the Third World are looking favourably at the "By Catch" project.

Dr. Altsopp cited a Food and Agriculture Organisation estimate showing that the total quantity of fish available from "By Catch" in the Caribbean was about 1 million tons a year while the total amount available annually was nearly 10 million tons.

"This we consider an unacceptable waste," he remarked.

GUYANA

BRIEFS

'PNC' BIENNIAL CONGRESS DELEGATIONS--The ruling People's National Congress (PNC) Party is sparing no pains to ensure that local and foreign delegates are hospitably treated when they participate in the party's Third Biennial Congress at Sophia from Saturday, August 18 to Saturday, August 25. Among the fraternal organisations who are expected to participate are the Communist Party of Cuba, the Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian Communist Party, the United National Independence Party of Zambia, Communist Party of Uruguay, St. Vincent Labour Party, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Labour Party, Parti Democratique de Guinée (PDG), Fretilino of Mozambique, MPLA of Angola, National Workers' Union of Guinea Bissau, Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Polish United Workers' Party, Mongolian Communist Party, People's Liberal Party of Bahamas, Polisario Front or the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and League of Communists of Yugoslavia among others. [Text] [Georgetown GUYANA CHRONICLE in English 19 Jun 79 p 16]

SOLIDARITY MONTH WITH DPRK--The Guyana Committee for Support of the Reunification of Korea will observe a month of solidarity with the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. As part of the programme of activities there will be a mass meeting and a book and photo exhibition at Bishops' High School on June 25. The programme will be chaired by Cde. Robert Williams, the PNC's Georgetown Regional Chairman, and the proceedings will be declared open at 6.00 p. m. by Cde. Roerert Corbin, First Vice-Chairman of the PNC. This will be followed by two speeches--one by the Ambassador of the DPRK and another by a representative of the Guyana Committee for Support of the Reunification of Korea. A message of Cde. Kim Il Sung, President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will also be adopted, after which an international signature campaign will be launched. There will also be a film show. [Text] [Georgetown GUYANA CHRONICLE in English 22 Jun 79 p 8]

CSO: 3020

URUGUAY

COUNCIL MEMBER, 'ANCAP' PRESIDENT DISCUSS FUEL SITUATION

Rodriguez Larreta Assessment

Montevideo EL PAIS in Spanish 25 May 79 p 1

[Excerpts] In the course of the television program "Special Report," shown on Channel 12, Cabinet Minister Dr Daniel Rodriguez Larreta said that other, outside factors should not be added to the impact of the rise in the international price of oil.

Rodriguez Larreta said that the first to be hurt were the European countries. Arab nations balance of trade profits went from about \$6 billion to \$67 billion the following year.

But the Cabinet minister reminded us that the European countries largely overcame the situation since they began to receive excess profits from the oil-producing countries through financial investments and the increase in purchases of capital goods.

He said that this was not the case with developing countries like Uruguay since these do not represent an attractive financial market for the Arab sheiks nor do they export capital goods or major products.

We may say that Uruguay was one of the worst hit countries in the world. In our country, energy is derived from oil to a much greater extent than is the case in other countries, he noted.

He recalled that Uruguay imported \$45 million worth of oil in 1974 but that today, for a scarcely larger amount, it spends over \$200 million. He said that the importance of oil in our trade balance has quintupled. In 1973 there were surplus balances of trade and payments but thereafter oil imports at increasingly higher costs prevented these surpluses, bringing with them big deficits.

Pass on Price Rises

Dr Rodriguez Larreta said that he shares the conviction of ANCAP [National Fuels, Alcohol and Cement Administration] director Brigadier General Borad

that the new international prices should be immediately passed on to consumers. He said that this is only plausible, that it is an axiom from which we dare not depart.

However, Dr Rodriguez Larreta said that he did not share the belief that the ANCAP should show a surplus as it announced a little while ago: "It is important for the ANCAP to be in a healthy financial situation but I feel that it is harmful for it to show a surplus; furthermore, inasmuch as it operates as a monopoly, it does not deserve to have one."

He also said that the administration of that organization is very effective, the bureaucracy has been reduced and there is greater efficiency.

The Cabinet minister, moreover, noted discrepancies in the way investments are financed through a tariff surplus.

Investments, that is, incorporations of new equipment, must be financed with long-term obligations. On the other hand, this generation is paying for machinery future generations will also be using and that is not fair.

He said that between 1974 and 1978 the international market price of oil rose by 25 percent and during the same period, to mention one case, the price of gasoline rose by 350 percent.

Summing up his point of view, he said that the adjustment required to adapt to the international price is influenced by Uruguayan domestic inflation, taxes and the financing of investments. In the judgment of this economist, this is not the way it should be. In such cases, taxes should be amended by reducing rates so that the yields are the same, but no more than that.

The "Special Report" panelist concluded that the impact of the Arab sheiks' decisions is in itself enough to add to this other factors, which is why the situation should not be exploited for tax purposes.

Borad on Expenditures

Montevideo EL PAIS in Spanish 25 May 79 p 8

[Article: "The Refinery Will Never Be Privately Controlled"]

[Excerpts] Brig Gen Jorge Borad says that the ANCAP fuel sector will never be privately controlled. On the "Special Report" program he spoke about the organization's profit margin as well as its share of tax income. He maintained that, if the ANCAP were to pass its profits on through price cuts, this would result in a reduction of only 7 centesimos a liter. He said that the organization had to operate under appropriate conditions.

In response to a question on the organization's profits posed on the "Special Report" program, Brigadier General Borad claimed that the ANCAP assumes a reasonable profit margin. On the telecast directed by Walter

Nessi with the aid of newspaper consultant Daniel Herrera Lussich, he explained that last year's profit was not excessive since it amounted to 5.7 percent of the total sales volume.

The ANCAP director reported that this state industrial enterprise has a daily income of \$1.2 million which amounts to an average annual income of from \$400 to \$410 million.

He emphasized that a run-down enterprise cannot perform its mission and said that the difference between the public and private sectors lies in the fact that, while a private enterprise makes a profit, a public enterprise has to perform a service and maintain an adequate level of income.

Before Channel 12 cameras, Brigadier General Borad said that "if we were to pass our profits on to reduce rates, as has been asked here, we would achieve nothing by it. The consumer would benefit from it by merely 7 centesimos a liter and the enterprise would find itself on the verge of ruin."

Asked about the importance of the influence of administrative expenditures on prices, Brigadier General Borad yielded the floor to ANCAP general manager Eng Andres Tierno who said that administrative expenditures for an oil enterprise influence prices to the extent of 8 percent. The chief expense is represented by the cost of crude oil and other expenditures.

Regarding fuel taxes, the ANCAF director said that "in our country these are used as a source of tax income. We are collectors of sums destined for public works, the energy fund, general revenue and to a limited extent for the antituberculosis campaign. The government eliminates certain types of taxes in accordance with current economic policy patterns and concentrates on other areas."

He went on to say that the fact that the price of fuel in Uruguay may be considered to be high can be explained by the price of the raw material. He said that prices are similar to those of the various European countries, which include high taxes.

Hope Through Prospecting

Engineer Tierno answered a question on oil exploration. "Until it can be proven that there is no oil, the question remains open for the experts," he said. "There is hope of finding oil along the continental shelf. Inside Uruguay, we have been unable to conduct an exhaustive search due to technical difficulties. Therefore, the question is still open."

Brigadier General Borad emphasized that ANCAF profits are lower than the 8 percent authorized by law.

The distribution of this small surplus would mean a price drop of only a few centavos. He also said that the investments are financed by 8, 9, 10,

11 and even 13-year loans and that the application of the surplus toward financing does not mean a higher rate.

In reply to a question from a viewer as to whether the enterprise's "eternal flame" could be made use of, Engineer Tierno said that it performs a safety function, that of burning off possible emanations and avoiding a serious accident. A viewer asked whether Director Borad used gasoline coupons. Brigadier General Borad replied that he had traded in his car to buy a smaller one because of the rise in prices and gave the name of the automobile dealer from whom he had bought it. He also said that he receives only an official general wage scale salary which amounts to 60 percent of what he would normally earn as director of the ANCAP.

In answer to another question, he stressed his opposition to placing the ANCAP under private control. He vehemently noted that that would never happen. He said that the ANCAP belongs to all Uruguayans. He said that certain associated sectors could be placed under private control but not fuels.

He said that, if they were in private hands, any surpluses, even bigger ones than the company has, would go into foreign pockets.

He also said that, if it were not for the ANCAP, Uruguay would have suffered shortages of some products like those now occurring in California and Washington, as can be seen in the newspapers, with people lining up at gas stations.

Regarding the cost of shipping oil, Engineer Tierno said that 50 percent of the oil is transported in Uruguayan tankers. Even more could be shipped this way but not all of it since it is impossible to schedule shipments in terms of the different sources, which would mean the participation of Uruguayan tankers at other charter rates, that is, rates for other countries, an arrangement that at present brings in very little profit.

The ANCAP director said that the feasibility of using alcohol as a substitute is being studied but that alcohol is even more expensive than gasoline. He noted that the case of Brazil is different from ours because Brazil commands an adequate labor force and enormous expanses of forestland from which it can obtain alcohol and, furthermore, it possesses a climate more suited than ours is to farming, with constant, favorable temperatures, no frosts, etc. This is already a going concern for Brazil; at least for the moment, for Uruguay it is not.

11,466
CSO: 3010

GOVERNMENT PASSES NEW TAX LEGISLATION

Montevideo EL PAIS in Spanish 22 May 79 p 1

[Text] IVA [Value-Added Tax]: The basic rate is decreased to 14 percent, and the minimum rate is increased to 8 percent. The list of products which pay the "minimum" and of exemptions (bread, medicines, etc.) is reduced. The unified tax is repealed.

The IMPROME [Land/Rural Productivity Tax] is repealed and replaced by the IMAGRO [expansion unknown] (without an untaxable minimum, on net income, with rates from 25 to 70 percent) and the IMUNI (a tax on the first sale of agricultural-livestock products).

The following taxes are repealed: sales, auctions and shipments of cattle, primary education, agricultural-livestock transactions, the single tax on banking activity, contracts, real estate transactions, luxuries, transfer and registration of motor vehicles, contributions of rural owners, commercialization of meat, commercialization of wool, deductions from wool exports.

The IMESI (Specific Domestic Tax) is established and includes the old IMECO [expansion unknown], which as such disappears. It includes a 10-percent surcharge on the use of electricity, fuels, luxury property on first sale, etc.

As for the tax on industrial and commercial income, the following are repealed in a gradual, 3-year process: exemptions for reinvestment, exemptions for export; and a new accounting system is established to take into consideration the effects of inflation.

The inheritance tax is increased 20 percent, and the sections of the various categories are shortened.

The president is authorized to repeal businessmen's contributions to the BPS [Welfare Benefits Bank], ASSE [Administration for Social Security Benefits for the Sick], and Family Allowances, National Housing Fund (a charge against businessmen and the BPS), premium to the Work Accidents Insurance Bank, taxes collected for the BPS, Industrial and Commercial Fund. These will be absorbed totally or partially by the IVA, which will increase in the process.

Provision is made for the establishment of a Registry of Tax Delinquents and the possibility of publishing it, as well as other measures to prevent tax evasion.

URUGUAY

LATEST DEVELOPMENT IN CAPITAL ACCESS ROUTES PROJECT REPORTED

Montevideo EL PAIS in Spanish 24 May 79 p 8

[Excerpts] The capital of the republic will undergo a substantial change with the start of work on the access roads projects.

Reportedly, the investment will be \$60 million, involving an area of 320,000 square meters of pavement; and it is estimated that the economic benefits will be quite sizable. These comments were made by the minister of transportation and public works, Eduardo J. Sampson, who also added that he hoped the projects would be started this year.

Vehicular traffic will move more quickly, and a saving in gasoline and spare parts will be achieved. At the same time, there will be an increase in international transportation, and the Port of Montevideo will be given new impetus.

More than \$35 million will be supplied by the Inter-American Development Bank for this project. The routes to be benefited by this project, which will involve large-scale construction work, are Route 1, Brigadier General Manuel Oribe, and Route 5, Brigadier General Frutuoso Rivera.

With respect to Route 1, the region of influence in the western and southwestern sector covers an area equal to 37 percent of the country. On the other hand, Route 5 covers 26 percent of the territory, lands where there are livestock and crop production in the northern and southern parts, respectively.

Col Edgar Morales Speaks

He said that at the level of the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works a commission had been created with representatives from various offices of this ministry whose purpose is to facilitate everything having to do with expropriations needed to provide access to Montevideo via Routes 1, 5 and 8.

The commission also includes technicians from the Land Surveying and Recording Office, an organization considered essential; as well as others of an internal character. I am the general coordinator of all these organizations, he added.

Basically, our major concern in this instance, he said, as with Belen-Constitucion is that as a development project the social cost be as low as possible. We are therefore studying everything that has to do with this factor so that expropriations will not have an impact from that standpoint.

Scope of the Project

Construction works in the definitive project include:

1. Construction of the first stretch of Route 1 with a 13.2-meter roadbed, consisting of an asphalt pavement 7.2 meters wide and 3-meter-wide shoulders--also paved--on each side of the road. It will be 12 kilometers in length.
2. Construction of the first stretch of Route 5, with characteristics similar to Route 1 described above. It will be built from kilometer marker 32 on Route 5 to the outskirts of La Tablada. It will be 21 kilometers in length.
3. Construction of the access road between Lecocq Road and Artigas Boulevard at their intersection with Uruguayana, which will be 10 kilometers in length.

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INAC RELEASES REPORT ON JANUARY-APRIL MEAT EXPORTS

Monteivideo EL PAIS in Spanish 15 May 79 p 5

[Text] Uruguay exported nearly 25,000 tons of meat during the first 4 months of this year. This total included 17,510,014 tons of cattle, while in the month of April 1979, 62,432 animals were slaughtered. In regard to the April activity, it is enough to point out that prices did not undergo any change with respect to prior weeks.

In the first 4 months of this year Uruguay exported nearly 25,000 tons of meat. As a matter of fact, according to a report issued by the National Institute of Meat (INAC), in the period from January to April 1979 exports of meat products (cattle, sheep, horses, poultry), pork products, offal and by-products totaled 24,408,938 kilograms, while in April alone the export total was 5,216,356 kilograms.

In this connection, diversified slaughterings in the month of April totaled 62,432 cattle, a figure which breaks down as follows: 50,194 yearlings, 9,909 cows, 1,585 bulls and 568 calves.

In the same period, 756 sheep were slaughtered.

A comparative analysis of slighterings by exporters of refrigerated meats, from 1 to 30 April, reveals that the largest slaughterer of cattle was the Carrasco Meat-Packing Plant, with a total of 7,584 animals, followed by the San Jacinto Company with 7,302 animals.

In the sheep sector, the meat-packing plants slaughtered the largest number, with 541 animals out of a total of 756.

It should be noted that the only meat packer operating in the sheep sector, apart from the above-mentioned plant, was the Comargen Meat Packing Plant, with 215 animals.

Finally, it should be noted that, according to the figures supplied by the INAC, the price per kilo of on-the-hoof yearlings ranged between N\$5.50 and N\$5.80, which shows that no changes took place vis-a-vis preceding weeks.

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FISH EXPORTS DOUBLE, NEW MARKETS ADDED DURING FIRST QUARTER

Montevideo EL PAIS in Spanish 16 May 79 p 9

[Text] Exports of fish in the first quarter of this year doubled the figures for the same period in 1978, according to information given to EL PAIS by INAPE [National Fishing Institute] sources.

It was revealed that catches of the various species were also doubled and by far exceeded those recorded in the first quarter of last year.

Consequently, INAPE authorities estimate that the goal of US\$35 million set for the present fiscal year will no doubt be surpassed.


New Markets

Another highly significant fact is the addition of new markets for the various Uruguayan species.

The same sources told EL PAIS that in the first quarter of this year the following were added to the list of importing countries: Nigeria, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the FRG and Japan.

It is also worth noting that the two principal buyers of Uruguayan fish, Brazil and the United States, increased their imports during the above-mentioned period.

Brazil, which during the period January-March 1978 had bought 2,056 tons of Uruguayan fish, in the same period this year purchased a total of 3,900 tons. The United States, in turn, increased its purchases from 600 to 900 tons.



El presente gráfico comparativo entre las exportaciones cumplidas en el primer trimestre de los años 1978 y 1979, es por demás eloquente. No sólo se duplicaron las negociaciones con el exterior, sino también las capturas realizadas por la flota pesquera nacional.

Key:

1. thousands of tons
2. thousands of dollars
3. & 4. January-March

This chart, which compares exports in the first quarters of 1978 and 1979, is quite eloquent. Fish sales abroad doubled, as did the catches of the national fishing fleet.

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VARIOUS ENTITIES ANALYZE STATE OF MEAT MARKET

April Facts, Figures

Montevideo EL PAIS in Spanish 27 May 79 p 17

[Article: "5,216,356 Kilograms of Meat Exported in April"]

[Text] According to the monthly Bulletin of the National Meat Institute (INAC), with imports totaling 1,438,568 kg, Spain became the chief buyer of Uruguayan meat in April.

Uruguayan exports totaled 5,216,356 kg, including beef, mutton and lamb, horsemeat, poultry, sausages, sausage meat and byproducts.

Buyers

Israel was the second biggest buyer of our products in April with 892,225 kg, relegating Brazil to third place with 837,577 kg.

The following countries were included on the INAC Bulletin list of buyers of Uruguayan meat: Ghana, the FRG, Venezuela, Italy, the Netherlands, the United States, France, Ivory Coast, Chile, the United Kingdom, Japan, Kuwait, Belgium and Hong Kong.

Sales to Brazil

At the same time, we have been officially informed that the negotiations meatpacker exporters had been conducting with regard to renegotiation of sales made to Brazil in January have been concluded.

As a result of these negotiations, 21,421 tons of refrigerated and frozen balanced quarters were sold at prices of \$1,355 and \$1,400 a ton respectively, F.O.B. plant.

Shipments to Brazil began last week, consisting of cargos of several thousand tons of refrigerated meat.

Cattle Slaughtering

During the first 12 days of this month, a total of 39,930 cattle, broken down into 31,034 steers, 7,581 cows, 978 bulls, 235 calves and 102 oxen, were slaughtered.

In accordance with the schedule provided by the INAC, during these 12 days the Tacuarembo Meatpacking Plant slaughtered 7,116 head of cattle, 5,907 of which were steers.

The Canelones Meatpacking Plant slaughtered a total of 5,234 head of cattle and the Carrasco plant 5,063.

Reporters Question Minister Otero

Montevideo EL PAIS in Spanish 1 Jun 79 p 6

[Report on interview with Minister of Agriculture and Fishing Jorge Leon Otero in front of the Cabinet Office on 31 May 1979: "Otero: 'Rise in the Price of Meat Due to Foreign Pressure'"]

[Text] The rise in the price of meat was the central theme of the dialogue initiated yesterday by reporters with the minister of agriculture and fishing when they approached him as he was leaving the Cabinet Office after having taken part in the COSENNA [National Security Council] meeting.

"It depends on foreign prices. When foreign trade is involved with a rise in price, and especially at the end of the sugar harvest when there is less cattle available, these alternatives suffer," Minister Otero noted. He added that the alternatives "may today be at a high and tomorrow at a low."

As we know, the butchers say that they are not to blame and that the rise in production cost to the consumer is due to the free trade system. Asked about this, Mr Otero said: "I don't want to start to pass judgment on the merchants' standpoint. I think that they too ought to cooperate, if as they say this system works in their favor, by trying to see to it that it is not destroyed for reasons stemming from the error of the kind of selfishness where everyone wants to make what he can now and no one ever looks at his advantages with an eye to the future."

Otero will attend the Rural Federation Congress to be held this weekend in Paysandu. He said he would listen to the opinions and criticisms of producers there.

Rural Association President Interviewed

Montevideo EL PAIS in Spanish 1 Jun 79 p 8

[Interview with Rural Association President Carlos Mattos Moglia by EL PAIS on 31 May 1979, place not given]

[Text] Perhaps as rarely in the country's history, the topic of meat (its production, marketing and distribution) has become a focus of interest for Uruguayans. Almost 10 months after the new regulations that have liberalized the marketing of the product at all levels went into effect, producers, processors and butchers have, with approaches that do not always coincide, analyzed the alternatives to a process whose chief protagonist today is the consumer.

To get an overall picture of the situation we must recapitulate the impressions of the sectors involved. A few days ago, it was the butchers who made public their reasons through a communiqué and a press conference. To present another view of the problem to its readers, EL PAÍS yesterday interviewed the president of the Uruguayan Rural Association, Carlos Matos Moglia, who in the course of an extensive dialogue gave important, in some cases unexpected, details on the course of action initiated on 3 August 1978 and the prospects it lays open to us.

Matos: the Balance Sheet for These 10 Months

[Question] On 3 August 1978 the administration announced liberalization of all phases of meat marketing. Since then, various opinions have been heard on the successes or failures of the new system. As president of the Rural Association, what is your opinion of the results obtained during this period? What are the prospects?

[Answer] That is a very interesting question. The new measures implemented by the government went into effect in early August 1978. With the measures that have to be adopted in this field, we must take into account the time of year, the season. Any measure adopted in the fall will not increase the amount of cattle bred by a single cow since everything has to happen in its own time. By adopting this measure in August, a larger number of cows were bred.

Thus a first positive point arises from the observation that last fall practically all the fattened cattle in the country were slaughtered, which is why the steps taken in August, in a farming and stockraising economy that had gone through bad years (drop in international market prices, weather problems, etc.), succeeded in producing a satisfactory supply throughout the spring, one that had not been obtained for a long time. It was not obtained because there were no cattle ready for market, because, given the same prices without any changes, it is always more profitable and better results are achieved with cattle marketed in the fall, which have the advantage of all the summer grazing, and steers that mature in the fall, which are fatter and cheapest to fatten. If we try to carry these fat cattle until the spring, they lose weight due to cold spells and because of the weather the production of fodder in Uruguay declines sharply in May, June, July and August, during which time it drops to a third of what it is at other times of the year. The rigorous climate practically "evaporates" all the fat the animal may have. In other words, it costs more to produce fattened cattle during that season than in the fall.

Last year, despite this, there was already enough cattle to fairly acceptably meet the demand for the entire spring, something that had not happened in years.

Increased Breeding

It is estimated that last spring 350,000 cows were bred which, because the measures were not adopted, were slaughtered; that is, this worked to the detriment of the herds and led to an increase in the number of calves. This much is positive: We note an increase in the stock, a greater future potential.

We have to take into consideration that this policy was begun in August and the first calf to be produced during its term is yet to be born, given the fact that it was conceived in October and the gestation period lasts 9 months.

Decline in the Amount of Cattle on Hand

These 350,000 cows that were bred detracted from, resulted in a decline in the amount of fattened cattle on hand. Normally, 1.7 million head of cattle are slaughtered, less 350 or 400,000 breeding cows (the cows that were bred), leaving 1.3 million head available for slaughtering. National consumption accounts for about 1 million of these, leaving an exportable balance of 300,000. In normal times, it takes about 7,000 tons to supply Montevideo and Canelones, but not in exceptional ones like early 1978 and late 1977 — when the price of meat was under 50 percent of what it had been in prior years — when that figure could go to over 10,000. At those times, when prices at one point increased by 1,500 percent, the price of meat rose by 750 percent.

The figure of from 6 to 7,000 tons was valid when Montevideo and Canelones formed a closed circuit, but nowadays meat from other departments may appear on the scene.

Butchers' Profit

[Question] Butchers have recently pointed out that they operate with a minimum profit margin of 20 percent and they maintain that they are not responsible for the rise in consumer prices. What is your opinion of these claims?

[Answer] All right. At a recent meeting, the butchers urged their colleagues to trim their profit margins so that they do not exceed 20 percent. Previously, they were about 30 percent, resulting in less consumption because prices were going up at an abnormally rapid rate, since the butchers' normal profit margin has been 12 percent.

National consumption is about 1 million head of cattle. Thus a margin of 20 or 25 percent means that the equivalent of from 200 to 250,000 head is not sold in the final phase of marketing.

[Question] How much are 200,000 head of cattle worth?

[Answer] We have to figure about 2,500 new pesos a head, or about \$300.

[Question] Then this means that in the final phase \$60 million (200,000 head at \$300) worth of meat a year goes unsold in the butcher shops?

[Answer] That's right.

[Question] How many butchers are there in Uruguay?

[Answer] A little over 2,000. Thus each butcher shop has a mean annual margin (from which operating costs have to be deducted) of about \$30,000, or about 230,000 new pesos.

[Question] Is this the situation in all cases?

[Answer] No. I know that the supermarkets are holding to the usual butcher's margin of 12 percent.

[Question] With what result?

[Answer] According to conversations I have had with supermarket directors, I can say to you that they have increased sales by about 10 percent in that department.

Critical Cycles Will Be Less Frequent

[Question] Uruguayan meat production is subject to cycles of abundance during sugar harvests and scarcity following the harvests. Will the new system help absorb the shocks to the economy?

[Answer] The "peaks" will be evened out somewhat. I think as soon as spring.

[Question] Do we have a supply large enough to meet domestic and international demand?

[Answer] With the August change of policy, leaving supply and export open to free competition and setting aside restrictions, the government has extended priority to national consumption. Before, the latter was sacrificed and we went without meat for months despite the fact that it was cheap. But now the price of meat is at a realistic level.

[Question] Is it not harmful for the country to reduce exports in favor of national consumption?

[Answer] No, because it allows production to develop. And actually, the supply will not increase; it will be maintained, and the increased production will be used for export. This plan will lead to greater production, therefore to a greater amount of meat available for export, thus controlling

sugar harvest "peaks." With fluctuating prices set by supply and demand, but which at the present time are influenced by the active international market, it would be detrimental to the country for foreign prices to be low just as it would for domestic consumption.

Stabilization Fund

[Question] During the past few decades, the international meat production sector has clearly exhibited periods of prosperity followed by periods of depression. We are now apparently entering a cycle of prosperity. What can be done to avoid the next depression cycle, which seems to be inevitable, given the ones we have suffered in the past?

[Answer] This problem has given rise to countless opinions. Cycles are a familiar occurrence not only in the meat sector but also for other products and the economy in general. They can be prevented with an open policy. But there are some isolated, unpredictable situations, like the oil crisis, which heightened the effect of the last meat cycle at a time when it was felt that such situations would not recur with any kind of frequency because earlier difficulties had been overcome (through the higher standard of living throughout the world).

The establishment of a stabilization fund in our country would not produce the favorable results attested in Australia since 5 years would be required to develop one really large enough to deal with the fluctuations. Perhaps it would be better for the country to invest such funds in greater diversification of the end products of the meatpacking industry in order to secure more markets.

[Question] Will a reserve be built up to prevent domestic shortages of meat?

[Answer] One is already being developed which I believe at present amounts to 10,000 tons. If this reserve is increased a bit, the supply will be assured for the whole year, since I suppose that steers ready for market will be available earlier than expected next spring.

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BRIEFS

CITRUS FRUITS TO POLAND--Paysandu--The fact that Uruguay will sell 350,000 crates of citrus fruits to Poland resulted in a visit to groves and industries in the coastal area by Polish and Uruguayan diplomats and businessmen. In the case of Paysandu, special stress was placed on observing groves of oranges, grapefruit and lemons, as well as the processing plants. According to statements made by the official of the state organization responsible for the purchase and distribution of citrus fruits in Poland, if Uruguayan production is increased, the order would total 1.2 to 1.3 million crates. Poland also has special interest in negotiating for fishing boats, urea, fertilizers, pesticides, etc. [Excerpts] [Montevideo EL PAIS in Spanish 20 May 79 p 7] 8143

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